staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 97 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/tools/perf/util/zlib.c b/tools/perf/util/zlib.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1f7c06523
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/zlib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <zlib.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <internal/lib.h>
+
+#include "util/compress.h"
+
+#define CHUNK_SIZE  16384
+
+int gzip_decompress_to_file(const char *input, int output_fd)
+{
+	int ret = Z_STREAM_ERROR;
+	int input_fd;
+	void *ptr;
+	int len;
+	struct stat stbuf;
+	unsigned char buf[CHUNK_SIZE];
+	z_stream zs = {
+		.zalloc		= Z_NULL,
+		.zfree		= Z_NULL,
+		.opaque		= Z_NULL,
+		.avail_in	= 0,
+		.next_in	= Z_NULL,
+	};
+
+	input_fd = open(input, O_RDONLY);
+	if (input_fd < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (fstat(input_fd, &stbuf) < 0)
+		goto out_close;
+
+	ptr = mmap(NULL, stbuf.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, input_fd, 0);
+	if (ptr == MAP_FAILED)
+		goto out_close;
+
+	if (inflateInit2(&zs, 16 + MAX_WBITS) != Z_OK)
+		goto out_unmap;
+
+	zs.next_in = ptr;
+	zs.avail_in = stbuf.st_size;
+
+	do {
+		zs.next_out = buf;
+		zs.avail_out = CHUNK_SIZE;
+
+		ret = inflate(&zs, Z_NO_FLUSH);
+		switch (ret) {
+		case Z_NEED_DICT:
+			ret = Z_DATA_ERROR;
+			/* fall through */
+		case Z_DATA_ERROR:
+		case Z_MEM_ERROR:
+			goto out;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+
+		len = CHUNK_SIZE - zs.avail_out;
+		if (writen(output_fd, buf, len) != len) {
+			ret = Z_DATA_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+	} while (ret != Z_STREAM_END);
+
+out:
+	inflateEnd(&zs);
+out_unmap:
+	munmap(ptr, stbuf.st_size);
+out_close:
+	close(input_fd);
+
+	return ret == Z_STREAM_END ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+bool gzip_is_compressed(const char *input)
+{
+	int fd = open(input, O_RDONLY);
+	const uint8_t magic[2] = { 0x1f, 0x8b };
+	char buf[2] = { 0 };
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return false;
+
+	rc = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+	close(fd);
+	return rc == sizeof(buf) ?
+	       memcmp(buf, magic, sizeof(buf)) == 0 : false;
+}