From ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muhammad Bilal Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 17:54:55 +0500 Subject: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse() rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/perf/util/zlib.c | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 97 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/perf/util/zlib.c (limited to 'tools/perf/util/zlib.c') diff --git a/tools/perf/util/zlib.c b/tools/perf/util/zlib.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1f7c06523 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/zlib.c @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "util/compress.h" + +#define CHUNK_SIZE 16384 + +int gzip_decompress_to_file(const char *input, int output_fd) +{ + int ret = Z_STREAM_ERROR; + int input_fd; + void *ptr; + int len; + struct stat stbuf; + unsigned char buf[CHUNK_SIZE]; + z_stream zs = { + .zalloc = Z_NULL, + .zfree = Z_NULL, + .opaque = Z_NULL, + .avail_in = 0, + .next_in = Z_NULL, + }; + + input_fd = open(input, O_RDONLY); + if (input_fd < 0) + return -1; + + if (fstat(input_fd, &stbuf) < 0) + goto out_close; + + ptr = mmap(NULL, stbuf.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, input_fd, 0); + if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) + goto out_close; + + if (inflateInit2(&zs, 16 + MAX_WBITS) != Z_OK) + goto out_unmap; + + zs.next_in = ptr; + zs.avail_in = stbuf.st_size; + + do { + zs.next_out = buf; + zs.avail_out = CHUNK_SIZE; + + ret = inflate(&zs, Z_NO_FLUSH); + switch (ret) { + case Z_NEED_DICT: + ret = Z_DATA_ERROR; + /* fall through */ + case Z_DATA_ERROR: + case Z_MEM_ERROR: + goto out; + default: + break; + } + + len = CHUNK_SIZE - zs.avail_out; + if (writen(output_fd, buf, len) != len) { + ret = Z_DATA_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + } while (ret != Z_STREAM_END); + +out: + inflateEnd(&zs); +out_unmap: + munmap(ptr, stbuf.st_size); +out_close: + close(input_fd); + + return ret == Z_STREAM_END ? 0 : -1; +} + +bool gzip_is_compressed(const char *input) +{ + int fd = open(input, O_RDONLY); + const uint8_t magic[2] = { 0x1f, 0x8b }; + char buf[2] = { 0 }; + ssize_t rc; + + if (fd < 0) + return false; + + rc = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); + close(fd); + return rc == sizeof(buf) ? + memcmp(buf, magic, sizeof(buf)) == 0 : false; +} -- cgit v1.3.1