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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /security/bpf/hooks.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/bpf/hooks.c')
-rw-r--r--security/bpf/hooks.c42
1 files changed, 42 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7b98f5d1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC.
+ */
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+
+bool bpf_lsm_initialized __ro_after_init;
+
+static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
+ #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME),
+ #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
+ #undef LSM_HOOK
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, bpf_inode_storage_free),
+};
+
+static const struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid = {
+ .name = "bpf",
+ .id = LSM_ID_BPF,
+};
+
+static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
+{
+ security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
+ &bpf_lsmid);
+ bpf_lsm_initialized = true;
+ pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes bpf_lsm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
+ .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct bpf_storage_blob),
+};
+
+DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = {
+ .id = &bpf_lsmid,
+ .init = bpf_lsm_init,
+ .blobs = &bpf_lsm_blob_sizes
+};