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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /security/bpf | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/bpf')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/bpf/Makefile | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/bpf/hooks.c | 42 |
2 files changed, 47 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/bpf/Makefile b/security/bpf/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c7a89a962 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/bpf/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC. + +obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) := hooks.o diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7b98f5d1e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +/* + * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC. + */ +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> +#include <linux/bpf_lsm.h> +#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h> + +bool bpf_lsm_initialized __ro_after_init; + +static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { + #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \ + LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME), + #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h> + #undef LSM_HOOK + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, bpf_inode_storage_free), +}; + +static const struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid = { + .name = "bpf", + .id = LSM_ID_BPF, +}; + +static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), + &bpf_lsmid); + bpf_lsm_initialized = true; + pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n"); + return 0; +} + +struct lsm_blob_sizes bpf_lsm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { + .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct bpf_storage_blob), +}; + +DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = { + .id = &bpf_lsmid, + .init = bpf_lsm_init, + .blobs = &bpf_lsm_blob_sizes +}; |
