staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 98 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c b/samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7e2d8397f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf.h>
+#include <bpf/libbpf.h>
+#include "trace_helpers.h"
+#include "bpf_util.h"
+
+#ifdef __mips__
+#define	MAX_ENTRIES  6000 /* MIPS n64 syscalls start at 5000 */
+#else
+#define	MAX_ENTRIES  1024
+#endif
+
+/* install fake seccomp program to enable seccomp code path inside the kernel,
+ * so that our kprobe attached to seccomp_phase1() can be triggered
+ */
+static void install_accept_all_seccomp(void)
+{
+	struct sock_filter filter[] = {
+		BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
+	};
+	struct sock_fprog prog = {
+		.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
+		.filter = filter,
+	};
+	if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, &prog))
+		perror("prctl");
+}
+
+int main(int ac, char **argv)
+{
+	struct bpf_link *link = NULL;
+	struct bpf_program *prog;
+	struct bpf_object *obj;
+	int key, fd, progs_fd;
+	const char *section;
+	char filename[256];
+	FILE *f;
+
+	snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s.bpf.o", argv[0]);
+	obj = bpf_object__open_file(filename, NULL);
+	if (libbpf_get_error(obj)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: opening BPF object file failed\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	prog = bpf_object__find_program_by_name(obj, "bpf_prog1");
+	if (!prog) {
+		printf("finding a prog in obj file failed\n");
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	/* load BPF program */
+	if (bpf_object__load(obj)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: loading BPF object file failed\n");
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	link = bpf_program__attach(prog);
+	if (libbpf_get_error(link)) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: bpf_program__attach failed\n");
+		link = NULL;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	progs_fd = bpf_object__find_map_fd_by_name(obj, "progs");
+	if (progs_fd < 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: finding a map in obj file failed\n");
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	bpf_object__for_each_program(prog, obj) {
+		section = bpf_program__section_name(prog);
+		/* register only syscalls to PROG_ARRAY */
+		if (sscanf(section, "kprobe/%d", &key) != 1)
+			continue;
+
+		fd = bpf_program__fd(prog);
+		bpf_map_update_elem(progs_fd, &key, &fd, BPF_ANY);
+	}
+
+	install_accept_all_seccomp();
+
+	f = popen("dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/null count=5", "r");
+	(void) f;
+
+	read_trace_pipe();
+
+cleanup:
+	bpf_link__destroy(link);
+	bpf_object__close(obj);
+	return 0;
+}