From ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muhammad Bilal Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 17:54:55 +0500 Subject: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse() rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 98 insertions(+) create mode 100644 samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c (limited to 'samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c') diff --git a/samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c b/samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7e2d8397f --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/bpf/tracex5_user.c @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "trace_helpers.h" +#include "bpf_util.h" + +#ifdef __mips__ +#define MAX_ENTRIES 6000 /* MIPS n64 syscalls start at 5000 */ +#else +#define MAX_ENTRIES 1024 +#endif + +/* install fake seccomp program to enable seccomp code path inside the kernel, + * so that our kprobe attached to seccomp_phase1() can be triggered + */ +static void install_accept_all_seccomp(void) +{ + struct sock_filter filter[] = { + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), + }; + struct sock_fprog prog = { + .len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter), + .filter = filter, + }; + if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, &prog)) + perror("prctl"); +} + +int main(int ac, char **argv) +{ + struct bpf_link *link = NULL; + struct bpf_program *prog; + struct bpf_object *obj; + int key, fd, progs_fd; + const char *section; + char filename[256]; + FILE *f; + + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s.bpf.o", argv[0]); + obj = bpf_object__open_file(filename, NULL); + if (libbpf_get_error(obj)) { + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: opening BPF object file failed\n"); + return 0; + } + + prog = bpf_object__find_program_by_name(obj, "bpf_prog1"); + if (!prog) { + printf("finding a prog in obj file failed\n"); + goto cleanup; + } + + /* load BPF program */ + if (bpf_object__load(obj)) { + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: loading BPF object file failed\n"); + goto cleanup; + } + + link = bpf_program__attach(prog); + if (libbpf_get_error(link)) { + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: bpf_program__attach failed\n"); + link = NULL; + goto cleanup; + } + + progs_fd = bpf_object__find_map_fd_by_name(obj, "progs"); + if (progs_fd < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: finding a map in obj file failed\n"); + goto cleanup; + } + + bpf_object__for_each_program(prog, obj) { + section = bpf_program__section_name(prog); + /* register only syscalls to PROG_ARRAY */ + if (sscanf(section, "kprobe/%d", &key) != 1) + continue; + + fd = bpf_program__fd(prog); + bpf_map_update_elem(progs_fd, &key, &fd, BPF_ANY); + } + + install_accept_all_seccomp(); + + f = popen("dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/null count=5", "r"); + (void) f; + + read_trace_pipe(); + +cleanup: + bpf_link__destroy(link); + bpf_object__close(obj); + return 0; +} -- cgit v1.3.1