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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /samples/bpf/tracex4_user.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'samples/bpf/tracex4_user.c')
-rw-r--r--samples/bpf/tracex4_user.c96
1 files changed, 96 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/samples/bpf/tracex4_user.c b/samples/bpf/tracex4_user.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a5145ad72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/bpf/tracex4_user.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/* Copyright (c) 2015 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include <bpf/bpf.h>
+#include <bpf/libbpf.h>
+
+struct pair {
+ long long val;
+ __u64 ip;
+};
+
+static __u64 time_get_ns(void)
+{
+ struct timespec ts;
+
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts);
+ return ts.tv_sec * 1000000000ull + ts.tv_nsec;
+}
+
+static void print_old_objects(int fd)
+{
+ long long val = time_get_ns();
+ __u64 key, next_key;
+ struct pair v;
+
+ key = write(1, "\e[1;1H\e[2J", 11); /* clear screen */
+
+ key = -1;
+ while (bpf_map_get_next_key(fd, &key, &next_key) == 0) {
+ bpf_map_lookup_elem(fd, &next_key, &v);
+ key = next_key;
+ if (val - v.val < 1000000000ll)
+ /* object was allocated more then 1 sec ago */
+ continue;
+ printf("obj 0x%llx is %2lldsec old was allocated at ip %llx\n",
+ next_key, (val - v.val) / 1000000000ll, v.ip);
+ }
+}
+
+int main(int ac, char **argv)
+{
+ struct bpf_link *links[2];
+ struct bpf_program *prog;
+ struct bpf_object *obj;
+ char filename[256];
+ int map_fd, j = 0;
+
+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s.bpf.o", argv[0]);
+ obj = bpf_object__open_file(filename, NULL);
+ if (libbpf_get_error(obj)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: opening BPF object file failed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* load BPF program */
+ if (bpf_object__load(obj)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: loading BPF object file failed\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ map_fd = bpf_object__find_map_fd_by_name(obj, "my_map");
+ if (map_fd < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: finding a map in obj file failed\n");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ bpf_object__for_each_program(prog, obj) {
+ links[j] = bpf_program__attach(prog);
+ if (libbpf_get_error(links[j])) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: bpf_program__attach failed\n");
+ links[j] = NULL;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ j++;
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ print_old_objects(map_fd);
+ sleep(1);
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ for (j--; j >= 0; j--)
+ bpf_link__destroy(links[j]);
+
+ bpf_object__close(obj);
+ return 0;
+}