From ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muhammad Bilal Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 17:54:55 +0500 Subject: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse() rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- samples/bpf/tracex4_user.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+) create mode 100644 samples/bpf/tracex4_user.c (limited to 'samples/bpf/tracex4_user.c') diff --git a/samples/bpf/tracex4_user.c b/samples/bpf/tracex4_user.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a5145ad72 --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/bpf/tracex4_user.c @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* Copyright (c) 2015 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include + +struct pair { + long long val; + __u64 ip; +}; + +static __u64 time_get_ns(void) +{ + struct timespec ts; + + clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts); + return ts.tv_sec * 1000000000ull + ts.tv_nsec; +} + +static void print_old_objects(int fd) +{ + long long val = time_get_ns(); + __u64 key, next_key; + struct pair v; + + key = write(1, "\e[1;1H\e[2J", 11); /* clear screen */ + + key = -1; + while (bpf_map_get_next_key(fd, &key, &next_key) == 0) { + bpf_map_lookup_elem(fd, &next_key, &v); + key = next_key; + if (val - v.val < 1000000000ll) + /* object was allocated more then 1 sec ago */ + continue; + printf("obj 0x%llx is %2lldsec old was allocated at ip %llx\n", + next_key, (val - v.val) / 1000000000ll, v.ip); + } +} + +int main(int ac, char **argv) +{ + struct bpf_link *links[2]; + struct bpf_program *prog; + struct bpf_object *obj; + char filename[256]; + int map_fd, j = 0; + + snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s.bpf.o", argv[0]); + obj = bpf_object__open_file(filename, NULL); + if (libbpf_get_error(obj)) { + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: opening BPF object file failed\n"); + return 0; + } + + /* load BPF program */ + if (bpf_object__load(obj)) { + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: loading BPF object file failed\n"); + goto cleanup; + } + + map_fd = bpf_object__find_map_fd_by_name(obj, "my_map"); + if (map_fd < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: finding a map in obj file failed\n"); + goto cleanup; + } + + bpf_object__for_each_program(prog, obj) { + links[j] = bpf_program__attach(prog); + if (libbpf_get_error(links[j])) { + fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: bpf_program__attach failed\n"); + links[j] = NULL; + goto cleanup; + } + j++; + } + + while (1) { + print_old_objects(map_fd); + sleep(1); + } + +cleanup: + for (j--; j >= 0; j--) + bpf_link__destroy(links[j]); + + bpf_object__close(obj); + return 0; +} -- cgit v1.3.1