staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/io_uring/alloc_cache.h b/io_uring/alloc_cache.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..962b6e2d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/io_uring/alloc_cache.h
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef IOU_ALLOC_CACHE_H
+#define IOU_ALLOC_CACHE_H
+
+#include <linux/io_uring_types.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+
+/*
+ * Don't allow the cache to grow beyond this size.
+ */
+#define IO_ALLOC_CACHE_MAX	128
+
+void io_alloc_cache_free(struct io_alloc_cache *cache,
+			 void (*free)(const void *));
+bool io_alloc_cache_init(struct io_alloc_cache *cache,
+			 unsigned max_nr, unsigned int size,
+			 unsigned int init_bytes);
+
+void *io_cache_alloc_new(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, gfp_t gfp);
+
+static inline bool io_alloc_cache_put(struct io_alloc_cache *cache,
+				      void *entry)
+{
+	if (cache->nr_cached < cache->max_cached) {
+		if (!kasan_mempool_poison_object(entry))
+			return false;
+		cache->entries[cache->nr_cached++] = entry;
+		return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+static inline void *io_alloc_cache_get(struct io_alloc_cache *cache)
+{
+	if (cache->nr_cached) {
+		void *entry = cache->entries[--cache->nr_cached];
+
+		/*
+		 * If KASAN is enabled, always clear the initial bytes that
+		 * must be zeroed post alloc, in case any of them overlap
+		 * with KASAN storage.
+		 */
+#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN)
+		kasan_mempool_unpoison_object(entry, cache->elem_size);
+		if (cache->init_clear)
+			memset(entry, 0, cache->init_clear);
+#endif
+		return entry;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline void *io_cache_alloc(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	void *obj;
+
+	obj = io_alloc_cache_get(cache);
+	if (obj)
+		return obj;
+	return io_cache_alloc_new(cache, gfp);
+}
+
+static inline void io_cache_free(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, void *obj)
+{
+	if (!io_alloc_cache_put(cache, obj))
+		kvfree(obj);
+}
+
+#endif