From ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muhammad Bilal Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 17:54:55 +0500 Subject: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse() rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- io_uring/alloc_cache.h | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+) create mode 100644 io_uring/alloc_cache.h (limited to 'io_uring/alloc_cache.h') diff --git a/io_uring/alloc_cache.h b/io_uring/alloc_cache.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..962b6e2d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/io_uring/alloc_cache.h @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef IOU_ALLOC_CACHE_H +#define IOU_ALLOC_CACHE_H + +#include +#include + +/* + * Don't allow the cache to grow beyond this size. + */ +#define IO_ALLOC_CACHE_MAX 128 + +void io_alloc_cache_free(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, + void (*free)(const void *)); +bool io_alloc_cache_init(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, + unsigned max_nr, unsigned int size, + unsigned int init_bytes); + +void *io_cache_alloc_new(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, gfp_t gfp); + +static inline bool io_alloc_cache_put(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, + void *entry) +{ + if (cache->nr_cached < cache->max_cached) { + if (!kasan_mempool_poison_object(entry)) + return false; + cache->entries[cache->nr_cached++] = entry; + return true; + } + return false; +} + +static inline void *io_alloc_cache_get(struct io_alloc_cache *cache) +{ + if (cache->nr_cached) { + void *entry = cache->entries[--cache->nr_cached]; + + /* + * If KASAN is enabled, always clear the initial bytes that + * must be zeroed post alloc, in case any of them overlap + * with KASAN storage. + */ +#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN) + kasan_mempool_unpoison_object(entry, cache->elem_size); + if (cache->init_clear) + memset(entry, 0, cache->init_clear); +#endif + return entry; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static inline void *io_cache_alloc(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, gfp_t gfp) +{ + void *obj; + + obj = io_alloc_cache_get(cache); + if (obj) + return obj; + return io_cache_alloc_new(cache, gfp); +} + +static inline void io_cache_free(struct io_alloc_cache *cache, void *obj) +{ + if (!io_alloc_cache_put(cache, obj)) + kvfree(obj); +} + +#endif -- cgit v1.3.1