staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 52 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/crypto/nh.h b/include/crypto/nh.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..465e85bf2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/nh.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * NH hash function for Adiantum
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_NH_H
+#define _CRYPTO_NH_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/* NH parameterization: */
+
+/* Endianness: little */
+/* Word size: 32 bits (works well on NEON, SSE2, AVX2) */
+
+/* Stride: 2 words (optimal on ARM32 NEON; works okay on other CPUs too) */
+#define NH_PAIR_STRIDE		2
+#define NH_MESSAGE_UNIT		(NH_PAIR_STRIDE * 2 * sizeof(u32))
+
+/* Num passes (Toeplitz iteration count): 4, to give ε = 2^{-128} */
+#define NH_NUM_PASSES		4
+#define NH_HASH_BYTES		(NH_NUM_PASSES * sizeof(u64))
+
+/* Max message size: 1024 bytes (32x compression factor) */
+#define NH_NUM_STRIDES		64
+#define NH_MESSAGE_WORDS	(NH_PAIR_STRIDE * 2 * NH_NUM_STRIDES)
+#define NH_MESSAGE_BYTES	(NH_MESSAGE_WORDS * sizeof(u32))
+#define NH_KEY_WORDS		(NH_MESSAGE_WORDS + \
+				 NH_PAIR_STRIDE * 2 * (NH_NUM_PASSES - 1))
+#define NH_KEY_BYTES		(NH_KEY_WORDS * sizeof(u32))
+
+/**
+ * nh() - NH hash function for Adiantum
+ * @key: The key.  @message_len + 48 bytes of it are used.  This is NH_KEY_BYTES
+ *	 if @message_len has its maximum length of NH_MESSAGE_BYTES.
+ * @message: The message
+ * @message_len: The message length in bytes.  Must be a multiple of 16
+ *		 (NH_MESSAGE_UNIT) and at most 1024 (NH_MESSAGE_BYTES).
+ * @hash: (output) The resulting hash value
+ *
+ * Note: the pseudocode for NH in the Adiantum paper iterates over 1024-byte
+ * segments of the message, computes a 32-byte hash for each, and returns all
+ * the hashes concatenated together.  In contrast, this function just hashes one
+ * segment and returns one hash.  It's the caller's responsibility to call this
+ * function for each 1024-byte segment and collect all the hashes.
+ *
+ * Context: Any context.
+ */
+void nh(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len,
+	__le64 hash[NH_NUM_PASSES]);
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_NH_H */