From ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muhammad Bilal Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 17:54:55 +0500 Subject: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse() rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/crypto/nh.h | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/crypto/nh.h (limited to 'include/crypto/nh.h') diff --git a/include/crypto/nh.h b/include/crypto/nh.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..465e85bf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/nh.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * NH hash function for Adiantum + */ + +#ifndef _CRYPTO_NH_H +#define _CRYPTO_NH_H + +#include + +/* NH parameterization: */ + +/* Endianness: little */ +/* Word size: 32 bits (works well on NEON, SSE2, AVX2) */ + +/* Stride: 2 words (optimal on ARM32 NEON; works okay on other CPUs too) */ +#define NH_PAIR_STRIDE 2 +#define NH_MESSAGE_UNIT (NH_PAIR_STRIDE * 2 * sizeof(u32)) + +/* Num passes (Toeplitz iteration count): 4, to give ε = 2^{-128} */ +#define NH_NUM_PASSES 4 +#define NH_HASH_BYTES (NH_NUM_PASSES * sizeof(u64)) + +/* Max message size: 1024 bytes (32x compression factor) */ +#define NH_NUM_STRIDES 64 +#define NH_MESSAGE_WORDS (NH_PAIR_STRIDE * 2 * NH_NUM_STRIDES) +#define NH_MESSAGE_BYTES (NH_MESSAGE_WORDS * sizeof(u32)) +#define NH_KEY_WORDS (NH_MESSAGE_WORDS + \ + NH_PAIR_STRIDE * 2 * (NH_NUM_PASSES - 1)) +#define NH_KEY_BYTES (NH_KEY_WORDS * sizeof(u32)) + +/** + * nh() - NH hash function for Adiantum + * @key: The key. @message_len + 48 bytes of it are used. This is NH_KEY_BYTES + * if @message_len has its maximum length of NH_MESSAGE_BYTES. + * @message: The message + * @message_len: The message length in bytes. Must be a multiple of 16 + * (NH_MESSAGE_UNIT) and at most 1024 (NH_MESSAGE_BYTES). + * @hash: (output) The resulting hash value + * + * Note: the pseudocode for NH in the Adiantum paper iterates over 1024-byte + * segments of the message, computes a 32-byte hash for each, and returns all + * the hashes concatenated together. In contrast, this function just hashes one + * segment and returns one hash. It's the caller's responsibility to call this + * function for each 1024-byte segment and collect all the hashes. + * + * Context: Any context. + */ +void nh(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len, + __le64 hash[NH_NUM_PASSES]); + +#endif /* _CRYPTO_NH_H */ -- cgit v1.3.1