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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c55
1 files changed, 55 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..24b48af27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*
+ * User address space access functions.
+ *
+ * For licencing details see kernel-base/COPYING
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/instrumented.h>
+
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+
+/**
+ * copy_from_user_nmi - NMI safe copy from user
+ * @to: Pointer to the destination buffer
+ * @from: Pointer to a user space address of the current task
+ * @n: Number of bytes to copy
+ *
+ * Returns: The number of not copied bytes. 0 is success, i.e. all bytes copied
+ *
+ * Contrary to other copy_from_user() variants this function can be called
+ * from NMI context. Despite the name it is not restricted to be called
+ * from NMI context. It is safe to be called from any other context as
+ * well. It disables pagefaults across the copy which means a fault will
+ * abort the copy.
+ *
+ * For NMI context invocations this relies on the nested NMI work to allow
+ * atomic faults from the NMI path; the nested NMI paths are careful to
+ * preserve CR2.
+ */
+unsigned long
+copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
+{
+ unsigned long ret;
+
+ if (!__access_ok(from, n))
+ return n;
+
+ if (!nmi_uaccess_okay())
+ return n;
+
+ /*
+ * Even though this function is typically called from NMI/IRQ context
+ * disable pagefaults so that its behaviour is consistent even when
+ * called from other contexts.
+ */
+ pagefault_disable();
+ instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
+ ret = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+ instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, ret);
+ pagefault_enable();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_from_user_nmi);