From ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Muhammad Bilal Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 17:54:55 +0500 Subject: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse() rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c (limited to 'arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c') diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..24b48af27 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * User address space access functions. + * + * For licencing details see kernel-base/COPYING + */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +/** + * copy_from_user_nmi - NMI safe copy from user + * @to: Pointer to the destination buffer + * @from: Pointer to a user space address of the current task + * @n: Number of bytes to copy + * + * Returns: The number of not copied bytes. 0 is success, i.e. all bytes copied + * + * Contrary to other copy_from_user() variants this function can be called + * from NMI context. Despite the name it is not restricted to be called + * from NMI context. It is safe to be called from any other context as + * well. It disables pagefaults across the copy which means a fault will + * abort the copy. + * + * For NMI context invocations this relies on the nested NMI work to allow + * atomic faults from the NMI path; the nested NMI paths are careful to + * preserve CR2. + */ +unsigned long +copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long ret; + + if (!__access_ok(from, n)) + return n; + + if (!nmi_uaccess_okay()) + return n; + + /* + * Even though this function is typically called from NMI/IRQ context + * disable pagefaults so that its behaviour is consistent even when + * called from other contexts. + */ + pagefault_disable(); + instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n); + ret = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n); + instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, ret); + pagefault_enable(); + + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(copy_from_user_nmi); -- cgit v1.3.1