1 files changed, 143 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/mm/mseal.c b/mm/mseal.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7a8ac66dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/mseal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ *  Implement mseal() syscall.
+ *
+ *  Copyright (c) 2023,2024 Google, Inc.
+ *
+ *  Author: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mempolicy.h>
+#include <linux/minmax.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mm_inline.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static bool range_contains_unmapped(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
+{
+	VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, current->mm, start);
+	unsigned long prev_end = start;
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+	for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) {
+		if (vma->vm_start > prev_end)
+			return true;
+
+		prev_end = vma->vm_end;
+	}
+
+	return prev_end < end;
+}
+
+static int __mseal_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
+{
+	VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, current->mm, start);
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev;
+
+	/* We know there are no gaps so this will be non-NULL. */
+	vma = vma_iter_load(&vmi);
+	prev = vma_prev(&vmi);
+	if (start > vma->vm_start)
+		prev = vma;
+
+	for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) {
+		const unsigned long curr_start = max(vma->vm_start, start);
+		const unsigned long curr_end = min(vma->vm_end, end);
+
+		if (!vma_test(vma, VMA_SEALED_BIT)) {
+			vma_flags_t vma_flags = vma->flags;
+
+			vma_flags_set(&vma_flags, VMA_SEALED_BIT);
+
+			vma = vma_modify_flags(&vmi, prev, vma, curr_start,
+					       curr_end, &vma_flags);
+			if (IS_ERR(vma))
+				return PTR_ERR(vma);
+			vma_start_write(vma);
+			vma_set_flags(vma, VMA_SEALED_BIT);
+		}
+
+		prev = vma;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int mseal_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = mmap_write_lock_killable(current->mm);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	if (range_contains_unmapped(start, end))
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+	else
+		err = __mseal_range(start, end);
+	mmap_write_unlock(current->mm);
+	return err;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mseal_mmap_page_zero() - If the MMAP_PAGE_ZERO personality is set, mseal()
+ * the page mapped at address zero.
+ */
+void mseal_mmap_page_zero(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(current->personality & MMAP_PAGE_ZERO)))
+		return;
+
+	err = mseal_range(0, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (err)
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("pid=%d, couldn't seal address 0, ret=%d.\n",
+				    task_pid_nr(current), err);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Seal VMAs in the specified input range to prevent an attacker replacing what
+ * is mapped in the range with something else.
+ *
+ * Disallows:
+ * - VMA unmapping, remapping or shrinking.
+ * - Overwriting the VMA with another one via mmap(), mremap() or similar.
+ * - Alteration of properties via mprotect()/pkey_mprotect().
+ * - Destructive madvise() behaviours (like MADV_DONTNEED) on anonymous read-only
+ *   ranges.
+ *
+ * Since unmapped ranges can be mapped at any time, the input range must span
+ * mapped ranges only.
+ *
+ * The flags parameter is currently reserved.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mseal, unsigned long, start, size_t, len, unsigned long, flags)
+{
+	size_t len_aligned;
+	unsigned long end;
+
+	/* Verify flags not set. */
+	if (flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	start = untagged_addr(start);
+	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	len_aligned = PAGE_ALIGN(len);
+	/* Check to see whether len was rounded up from small -ve to zero. */
+	if (len && !len_aligned)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	end = start + len_aligned;
+	if (end < start)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (end == start)
+		return 0;
+
+	return mseal_range(start, end);
+}