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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/testing/vsock/timeout.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/testing/vsock/timeout.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/vsock/timeout.c | 78 |
1 files changed, 78 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/vsock/timeout.c b/tools/testing/vsock/timeout.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1453d38e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/vsock/timeout.c @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* Timeout API for single-threaded programs that use blocking + * syscalls (read/write/send/recv/connect/accept). + * + * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc. + * + * Author: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> + */ + +/* Use the following pattern: + * + * timeout_begin(TIMEOUT); + * do { + * ret = accept(...); + * timeout_check("accept"); + * } while (ret < 0 && ret == EINTR); + * timeout_end(); + */ + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <time.h> +#include "timeout.h" + +static volatile bool timeout; + +/* SIGALRM handler function. Do not use sleep(2), alarm(2), or + * setitimer(2) while using this API - they may interfere with each + * other. + * + * If you need to sleep, please use timeout_sleep() provided by this API. + */ +void sigalrm(int signo) +{ + timeout = true; +} + +/* Start a timeout. Call timeout_check() to verify that the timeout hasn't + * expired. timeout_end() must be called to stop the timeout. Timeouts cannot + * be nested. + */ +void timeout_begin(unsigned int seconds) +{ + alarm(seconds); +} + +/* Exit with an error message if the timeout has expired */ +void timeout_check(const char *operation) +{ + if (timeout) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s timed out\n", operation); + exit(EXIT_FAILURE); + } +} + +/* Stop a timeout */ +void timeout_end(void) +{ + alarm(0); + timeout = false; +} + +/* Sleep in a timeout section. + * + * nanosleep(2) can be used with this API since POSIX.1 explicitly + * specifies that it does not interact with signals. + */ +int timeout_usleep(useconds_t usec) +{ + struct timespec ts = { + .tv_sec = usec / 1000000, + .tv_nsec = (usec % 1000000) * 1000, + }; + + return nanosleep(&ts, NULL); +} |
