Merge tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-tracegrafted

Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:

 - Don't destroy user event fields when removal fails

   User event fields are destroyed before the event is removed from
   visibility. But that can fail leaving the still visible event with no
   fields. Move the destroying of the fields to after the event is
   successfully removed from visibility.

 - Initialize function graph state is fork before calling
   copy_exec_state()

   For non-CLONE_VM forks, copy_exec_state() allocates a new
   task_exec_state. If that allocation fails, ftrace_graph_exit_task()
   will free the tasks ret_stack pointer. Since that pointer is still
   using the parent's ret_stack, it mistakenly frees the parent's
   pointer too.

   Call ftrace_graph_init() on the task first which will NULL out the
   new tasks's ret_stack and if the copy fails, it will not free
   anything.

 - Remove FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX

   The macro FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX was added but never used. Remove it.

 - Save ent_size in function graph printing of nested functions

   The function graph tracer needs to look at the next event to see if
   the next event is the return of the current function entry. If it is,
   it prints a single line:

	ktime_get();

   Otherwise it prints it like a nested function:

	tick_nohz_irq_exit() {
	    ktime_get();
	    kcpustat_irq_exit();
	}

   In order to look at the next event, it must save the current event so
   that it has the information to print from it. It saves the event in
   the iterator descriptor called "ent". What it doesn't save is the
   ent_size of the event which is now used to know if the function graph
   arguments are to be printed. The peek doesn't save the size so the
   size used happens to be that of the size of the last event that was
   seen.

   Save the entry event size in the iterator descriptor so that the
   correct size is used.

 - Fix several errors with freeing data in the histogram code

   The histogram code had a lot of leaked or or incorrect accounting
   when failures happen. Correct them.

 - Fix histogram regression of .percent and .graph modifiers

   Up until 6.3 histogram values could have "percent" or "graph"
   modifiers that changed how they were printed. But a change that added
   restricting histograms values from being strings, stack traces and
   other modifiers inadvertently prevented them from using the percent
   and graph modifiers, which were legal use cases for values.

   Put back the percent and graph modifiers.

 - Fix various typos in the comments

 - Set the trace_clock before initializing a histogram with clock
   argument

   The histogram API allows the user to specific which trace clock to
   use via a "clock=" string. The histogram is set up first before the
   clock is checked. If the passed in clock is not valid, it exits
   without fully fixing up the histogram leaving it on the list and a
   use-after-free can trigger.

   Update the clock argument first and if it fails then exit gracefully
   before the histogram trigger is placed on any lists.

 - Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event

   The function ftrace_set_clr_event() modifies the parse string and
   needs to put it back to what was passed in. It searches for ":mod:"
   via a strsep() but fails to put back the first ':' in the string.

   Add back the ':' in the passed in string.

 - Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file

   The options files are dynamically created and some tracers add their
   own options. When a tracer adds their own list of options, the
   trace_array holding them has an array to hold the list of options for
   each tracer. This array increases in size via a krealloc(), and the
   new entry gets a newly allocated array to hold the options of the new
   tracer being added.

   The element in each entry of the tracer's option array holds a
   pointer back to the trace_array, a pointer to the tracer it is
   associated to, a pointer to the flags of the option.

   The issue is that these arrays are freed when the trace_array is
   freed when its instance it represents is removed from the instances
   directory. There's a race that an open of one of these options files
   can happen when the instance is being removed.

   Add a new helper function to be called by the open function of the
   options file to iterate all existing trace_arrays under a lock and
   find the one that has the given option element in one of it's tracer
   arrays. If found, then update the associated trace_array's reference
   counter to keep it from being freed. If not found, have the open call
   return -ENODEV.

 - Disable interrupts when acquiring the lock in rb_wake_up_waiters()

   The function rb_wake_up_waiters() assumes it will be called in
   interrupt context and does not disable irqs when taking
   cpu_buffer->reader_lock, which can be called in hard interrupt
   context. The issue is in PREEMPT_RT, this function is called in
   thread context leaving this lock open to a deadlock.

   Take the lock with interrupts disabled.

 - Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash

   The tmp_ops used in update_ftrace_direct_mod() assigns its
   filter_hash field directly, but that field is annotated as __rcu and
   sparse complains. Assign it with rcu_assign_pointer()

 - Fix use-after-free in enable_trigger_private_data_free()

   The trace_event_call is accessed through the event_trigger_data's
   trace_event_file pointer to put the trace_event_call on freeing. The
   issue is that the trace_event_file data may have been freed already
   causing a use-after-free. Add a field to the event_trigger_data that
   points directly to the trace_event_call so that it can decrement its
   reference directly without needing to go through the
   trace_event_file.

 - Fix accounting of buffer data remote headers

   trace_buffer_desc_size() and trace_remote_alloc_buffer() undercount
   the number of pages is needed for the asked for size as it doesn't
   take into account the meta data on each page. Add a helper function
   to do the calculation properly and use that in these functions.

 - Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing

   The number of pages per remote ring buffer is capped by
   ring_buffer_desc::nr_page_va (32 bits). A buffer_size large enough to
   overflow that field would silently allocate a descriptor smaller than
   what was asked for.

 - Do not resize the subbuf order if any per_cpu buffer is disabled

   The mmapping of ring buffers disables resizing the subbuffers, but it
   is done per-cpu whereas the subbuf size change is done for all the
   per_cpu buffers under the buffer->mutex. It could change the size of
   some while the mapping is happening on others. Have the resize of the
   subbuf order check all the per_cpu buffers under the lock to see if
   any of them is disabled before starting and causing an inconsistency
   between buffers that are being mapped.

* tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace: (25 commits)
  ring-buffer: Check resize_disabled before publishing the new subbuf order
  tracing/remotes: Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing
  tracing/remotes: Account for ring buffer page header in size calculation
  tracing: Don't dereference trace_event_file in deferred trigger free
  ftrace: Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash
  ring-buffer: Acquire the lock with irqsave in rb_wake_up_waiters()
  tracing: Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file
  tracing: Fix ring_buffer_read_page_size() kernel-doc
  tracing: Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event()
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier
  tracing: Undo the registration when enabling the histogram trigger fails
  tracing: Take the reference before publishing the named histogram trigger
  tracing: Set the trace clock before registering the histogram trigger
  tracing: Fix typo "preceeded" in comment
  tracing: Fix typo "availabe" in comment
  tracing: Let histogram values keep the percent and graph modifiers
  tracing: Keep the entry count when the histogram stats allocation fails
  tracing: Free histogram the field rejected for a bad modifier
  tracing: Free histogram the var ref when its initialization fails
  ...

8 files changed, 648 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5f3d9e089
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+test_kexec_jump
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..874cfdd3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+# Makefile for kexec tests
+
+ARCH ?= $(shell uname -m 2>/dev/null || echo not)
+ARCH_PROCESSED := $(shell echo $(ARCH) | sed -e s/i.86/x86/ -e s/x86_64/x86/)
+
+ifeq ($(ARCH_PROCESSED),$(filter $(ARCH_PROCESSED),x86 ppc64le))
+TEST_PROGS := test_kexec_load.sh test_kexec_file_load.sh
+TEST_FILES := kexec_common_lib.sh
+
+include ../../../scripts/Makefile.arch
+
+ifeq ($(IS_64_BIT)$(ARCH_PROCESSED),1x86)
+TEST_PROGS += test_kexec_jump.sh
+TEST_GEN_PROGS := test_kexec_jump
+endif
+
+include ../lib.mk
+
+endif
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/config b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/config
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8962e862b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/config
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=y
+CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y
+CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/kexec_common_lib.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/kexec_common_lib.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..641ef0586
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/kexec_common_lib.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Kselftest framework defines: ksft_pass=0, ksft_fail=1, ksft_skip=4
+
+VERBOSE="${VERBOSE:-1}"
+IKCONFIG="/tmp/config-`uname -r`"
+KERNEL_IMAGE="/boot/vmlinuz-`uname -r`"
+SECURITYFS=$(grep "securityfs" /proc/mounts | awk '{print $2}')
+
+log_info()
+{
+	[ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && echo "[INFO] $1"
+}
+
+# The ksefltest framework requirement returns 0 for PASS.
+log_pass()
+{
+	[ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && echo "$1 [PASS]"
+	exit 0
+}
+
+# The ksefltest framework requirement returns 1 for FAIL.
+log_fail()
+{
+	[ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && echo "$1 [FAIL]"
+	exit 1
+}
+
+# The ksefltest framework requirement returns 4 for SKIP.
+log_skip()
+{
+	[ $VERBOSE -ne 0 ] && echo "$1"
+	exit 4
+}
+
+# Check efivar SecureBoot-$(the UUID) and SetupMode-$(the UUID).
+# (Based on kdump-lib.sh)
+get_efivarfs_secureboot_mode()
+{
+	local efivarfs="/sys/firmware/efi/efivars"
+	local secure_boot_file=""
+	local setup_mode_file=""
+	local secureboot_mode=0
+	local setup_mode=0
+
+	# Make sure that efivar_fs is mounted in the normal location
+	if ! grep -q "^\S\+ $efivarfs efivarfs" /proc/mounts; then
+		log_info "efivars is not mounted on $efivarfs"
+		return 0;
+	fi
+	secure_boot_file=$(find "$efivarfs" -name SecureBoot-* 2>/dev/null)
+	setup_mode_file=$(find "$efivarfs" -name SetupMode-* 2>/dev/null)
+	if [ -f "$secure_boot_file" ] && [ -f "$setup_mode_file" ]; then
+		secureboot_mode=$(hexdump -v -e '/1 "%d\ "' \
+			"$secure_boot_file"|cut -d' ' -f 5)
+		setup_mode=$(hexdump -v -e '/1 "%d\ "' \
+			"$setup_mode_file"|cut -d' ' -f 5)
+
+		if [ $secureboot_mode -eq 1 ] && [ $setup_mode -eq 0 ]; then
+			log_info "secure boot mode enabled (CONFIG_EFIVAR_FS)"
+			return 1;
+		fi
+	fi
+	return 0;
+}
+
+# On powerpc platform, check device-tree property
+# /proc/device-tree/ibm,secureboot/os-secureboot-enforcing
+# to detect secureboot state.
+get_ppc64_secureboot_mode()
+{
+	local secure_boot_file="/proc/device-tree/ibm,secureboot/os-secureboot-enforcing"
+	# Check for secure boot file existence
+	if [ -f $secure_boot_file ]; then
+		log_info "Secureboot is enabled (Device tree)"
+		return 1;
+	fi
+	log_info "Secureboot is not enabled (Device tree)"
+	return 0;
+}
+
+# Return the architecture of the system
+get_arch()
+{
+	echo $(arch)
+}
+
+# Check efivar SecureBoot-$(the UUID) and SetupMode-$(the UUID).
+# The secure boot mode can be accessed as the last integer of
+# "od -An -t u1 /sys/firmware/efi/efivars/SecureBoot-*".  The efi
+# SetupMode can be similarly accessed.
+# Return 1 for SecureBoot mode enabled and SetupMode mode disabled.
+get_secureboot_mode()
+{
+	local secureboot_mode=0
+	local system_arch=$(get_arch)
+
+	if [ "$system_arch" == "ppc64le" ]; then
+		get_ppc64_secureboot_mode
+		secureboot_mode=$?
+	else
+		get_efivarfs_secureboot_mode
+		secureboot_mode=$?
+	fi
+
+	if [ $secureboot_mode -eq 0 ]; then
+		log_info "secure boot mode not enabled"
+	fi
+	return $secureboot_mode;
+}
+
+require_root_privileges()
+{
+	if [ $(id -ru) -ne 0 ]; then
+		log_skip "requires root privileges"
+	fi
+}
+
+# Look for config option in Kconfig file.
+# Return 1 for found and 0 for not found.
+kconfig_enabled()
+{
+	local config="$1"
+	local msg="$2"
+
+	grep -E -q $config $IKCONFIG
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		log_info "$msg"
+		return 1
+	fi
+	return 0
+}
+
+# Attempt to get the kernel config first by checking the modules directory
+# then via proc, and finally by extracting it from the kernel image or the
+# configs.ko using scripts/extract-ikconfig.
+# Return 1 for found.
+get_kconfig()
+{
+	local proc_config="/proc/config.gz"
+	local module_dir="/lib/modules/`uname -r`"
+	local configs_module="$module_dir/kernel/kernel/configs.ko*"
+
+	if [ -f $module_dir/config ]; then
+		IKCONFIG=$module_dir/config
+		return 1
+	fi
+
+	if [ ! -f $proc_config ]; then
+		modprobe configs > /dev/null 2>&1
+	fi
+	if [ -f $proc_config ]; then
+		cat $proc_config | gunzip > $IKCONFIG 2>/dev/null
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			return 1
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	local extract_ikconfig="$module_dir/source/scripts/extract-ikconfig"
+	if [ ! -f $extract_ikconfig ]; then
+		log_skip "extract-ikconfig not found"
+	fi
+
+	$extract_ikconfig $KERNEL_IMAGE > $IKCONFIG 2>/dev/null
+	if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then
+		if [ ! -f $configs_module ]; then
+			log_skip "CONFIG_IKCONFIG not enabled"
+		fi
+		$extract_ikconfig $configs_module > $IKCONFIG
+		if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then
+			log_skip "CONFIG_IKCONFIG not enabled"
+		fi
+	fi
+	return 1
+}
+
+# Make sure that securityfs is mounted
+mount_securityfs()
+{
+	if [ -z $SECURITYFS ]; then
+		SECURITYFS=/sys/kernel/security
+		mount -t securityfs security $SECURITYFS
+	fi
+
+	if [ ! -d "$SECURITYFS" ]; then
+		log_fail "$SECURITYFS :securityfs is not mounted"
+	fi
+}
+
+# The policy rule format is an "action" followed by key-value pairs.  This
+# function supports up to two key-value pairs, in any order.
+# For example: action func=<keyword> [appraise_type=<type>]
+# Return 1 for found and 0 for not found.
+check_ima_policy()
+{
+	local action="$1"
+	local keypair1="$2"
+	local keypair2="$3"
+	local ret=0
+
+	mount_securityfs
+
+	local ima_policy=$SECURITYFS/ima/policy
+	if [ ! -e $ima_policy ]; then
+		log_fail "$ima_policy not found"
+	fi
+
+	if [ -n $keypair2 ]; then
+		grep -e "^$action.*$keypair1" "$ima_policy" | \
+			grep -q -e "$keypair2"
+	else
+		grep -q -e "^$action.*$keypair1" "$ima_policy"
+	fi
+
+	# invert "grep -q" result, returning 1 for found.
+	[ $? -eq 0 ] && ret=1
+	return $ret
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..c9ccb3c93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_file_load.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Loading a kernel image via the kexec_file_load syscall can verify either
+# the IMA signature stored in the security.ima xattr or the PE signature,
+# both signatures depending on the IMA policy, or none.
+#
+# To determine whether the kernel image is signed, this test depends
+# on pesign and getfattr.  This test also requires the kernel to be
+# built with CONFIG_IKCONFIG enabled and either CONFIG_IKCONFIG_PROC
+# enabled or access to the extract-ikconfig script.
+
+TEST="KEXEC_FILE_LOAD"
+. ./kexec_common_lib.sh
+
+trap "{ rm -f $IKCONFIG ; }" EXIT
+
+# Some of the IMA builtin policies may require the kexec kernel image to
+# be signed, but these policy rules may be replaced with a custom
+# policy.  Only CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS persists after
+# loading a custom policy.  Check if it is enabled, before reading the
+# IMA runtime sysfs policy file.
+# Return 1 for IMA signature required and 0 for not required.
+is_ima_sig_required()
+{
+	local ret=0
+
+	kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS=y" \
+		"IMA kernel image signature required"
+	if [ $? -eq 1 ]; then
+		log_info "IMA signature required"
+		return 1
+	fi
+
+	# The architecture specific or a custom policy may require the
+	# kexec kernel image be signed.  Policy rules are walked
+	# sequentially.  As a result, a policy rule may be defined, but
+	# might not necessarily be used.  This test assumes if a policy
+	# rule is specified, that is the intent.
+
+	# First check for appended signature (modsig), then xattr
+	if [ $ima_read_policy -eq 1 ]; then
+		check_ima_policy "appraise" "func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK" \
+			"appraise_type=imasig|modsig"
+		ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 1 ]; then
+			log_info "IMA or appended(modsig) signature required"
+		else
+			check_ima_policy "appraise" "func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK" \
+				"appraise_type=imasig"
+			ret=$?
+			[ $ret -eq 1 ] && log_info "IMA signature required";
+		fi
+	fi
+	return $ret
+}
+
+# The kexec_file_load_test() is complicated enough, require pesign.
+# Return 1 for PE signature found and 0 for not found.
+check_for_pesig()
+{
+	which pesign > /dev/null 2>&1 || log_skip "pesign not found"
+
+	pesign -i $KERNEL_IMAGE --show-signature | grep -q "No signatures"
+	local ret=$?
+	if [ $ret -eq 1 ]; then
+		log_info "kexec kernel image PE signed"
+	else
+		log_info "kexec kernel image not PE signed"
+	fi
+	return $ret
+}
+
+# The kexec_file_load_test() is complicated enough, require getfattr.
+# Return 1 for IMA signature found and 0 for not found.
+check_for_imasig()
+{
+	local ret=0
+
+	which getfattr > /dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $?	-eq 1 ]; then
+		log_skip "getfattr not found"
+	fi
+
+	line=$(getfattr -n security.ima -e hex --absolute-names $KERNEL_IMAGE 2>&1)
+	echo $line | grep -q "security.ima=0x03"
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		ret=1
+		log_info "kexec kernel image IMA signed"
+	else
+		log_info "kexec kernel image not IMA signed"
+	fi
+	return $ret
+}
+
+# Return 1 for appended signature (modsig) found and 0 for not found.
+check_for_modsig()
+{
+	local module_sig_string="~Module signature appended~"
+	local ret=0
+
+	tail --bytes $((${#module_sig_string} + 1)) $KERNEL_IMAGE | \
+		grep -q "$module_sig_string"
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		ret=1
+		log_info "kexec kernel image modsig signed"
+	else
+		log_info "kexec kernel image not modsig signed"
+	fi
+	return $ret
+}
+
+kexec_file_load_test()
+{
+	local succeed_msg="kexec_file_load succeeded"
+	local failed_msg="kexec_file_load failed"
+	local key_msg="try enabling the CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING"
+
+	line=$(kexec --load --kexec-file-syscall $KERNEL_IMAGE 2>&1)
+
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		kexec --unload --kexec-file-syscall
+
+		# In secureboot mode with an architecture  specific
+		# policy, make sure either an IMA or PE signature exists.
+		if [ $secureboot -eq 1 ] && [ $arch_policy -eq 1 ] && \
+			[ $ima_signed -eq 0 ] && [ $pe_signed -eq 0 ] \
+			  && [ $ima_modsig -eq 0 ]; then
+			log_fail "$succeed_msg (missing sig)"
+		fi
+
+		if [ $kexec_sig_required -eq 1 -o $pe_sig_required -eq 1 ] \
+		     && [ $pe_signed -eq 0 ]; then
+			log_fail "$succeed_msg (missing PE sig)"
+		fi
+
+		if [ $ima_sig_required -eq 1 ] && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ] \
+		     && [ $ima_modsig -eq 0 ]; then
+			log_fail "$succeed_msg (missing IMA sig)"
+		fi
+
+		if [ $pe_sig_required -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_appraise -eq 1 ] \
+		    && [ $ima_sig_required -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ] \
+	            && [ $ima_read_policy -eq 0 ]; then
+			log_fail "$succeed_msg (possibly missing IMA sig)"
+		fi
+
+		if [ $pe_sig_required -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_appraise -eq 0 ]; then
+			log_info "No signature verification required"
+		elif [ $pe_sig_required -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_appraise -eq 1 ] \
+		    && [ $ima_sig_required -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ] \
+	            && [ $ima_read_policy -eq 1 ]; then
+			log_info "No signature verification required"
+		fi
+
+		log_pass "$succeed_msg"
+	fi
+
+	# Check the reason for the kexec_file_load failure
+	echo $line | grep -q "Required key not available"
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		if [ $platform_keyring -eq 0 ]; then
+			log_pass "$failed_msg (-ENOKEY), $key_msg"
+		else
+			log_pass "$failed_msg (-ENOKEY)"
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	if [ $kexec_sig_required -eq 1 -o $pe_sig_required -eq 1 ] \
+	     && [ $pe_signed -eq 0 ]; then
+		log_pass "$failed_msg (missing PE sig)"
+	fi
+
+	if [ $ima_sig_required -eq 1 ] && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ]; then
+		log_pass "$failed_msg (missing IMA sig)"
+	fi
+
+	if [ $pe_sig_required -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_appraise -eq 1 ] \
+	    && [ $ima_sig_required -eq 0 ] && [ $ima_read_policy -eq 0 ] \
+	    && [ $ima_signed -eq 0 ]; then
+		log_pass "$failed_msg (possibly missing IMA sig)"
+	fi
+
+	log_pass "$failed_msg"
+	return 0
+}
+
+# kexec requires root privileges
+require_root_privileges
+
+# get the kernel config
+get_kconfig
+
+kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE=y" "kexec_file_load is enabled"
+if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+	log_skip "kexec_file_load is not enabled"
+fi
+
+# Determine which kernel config options are enabled
+kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=y" "IMA enabled"
+ima_appraise=$?
+
+kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y" \
+	"architecture specific policy enabled"
+arch_policy=$?
+
+kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING=y" \
+	"platform keyring enabled"
+platform_keyring=$?
+
+kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=y" "reading IMA policy permitted"
+ima_read_policy=$?
+
+kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE=y" \
+	"kexec signed kernel image required"
+kexec_sig_required=$?
+
+kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG=y" \
+	"PE signed kernel image required"
+pe_sig_required=$?
+
+is_ima_sig_required
+ima_sig_required=$?
+
+get_secureboot_mode
+secureboot=$?
+
+# Are there pe and ima signatures
+if [ "$(get_arch)" == 'ppc64le' ]; then
+	pe_signed=0
+else
+	check_for_pesig
+	pe_signed=$?
+fi
+
+check_for_imasig
+ima_signed=$?
+
+check_for_modsig
+ima_modsig=$?
+
+# Test loading the kernel image via kexec_file_load syscall
+kexec_file_load_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_jump.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_jump.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fbce28786
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_jump.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/reboot.h>
+#include <sys/reboot.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+
+asm(
+    "  .code64\n"
+    "  .data\n"
+    "purgatory_start:\n"
+
+    // Trigger kexec debug exception handling
+    "  int3\n"
+
+    // Set load address for next time
+    "  leaq purgatory_start_b(%rip), %r11\n"
+    "  movq %r11, 8(%rsp)\n"
+
+    // Back to Linux
+    "  ret\n"
+
+    // Same again
+    "purgatory_start_b:\n"
+
+    // Trigger kexec debug exception handling
+    "  int3\n"
+
+    // Set load address for next time
+    "  leaq purgatory_start(%rip), %r11\n"
+    "  movq %r11, 8(%rsp)\n"
+
+    // Back to Linux
+    "  ret\n"
+
+    "purgatory_end:\n"
+    ".previous"
+);
+extern char purgatory_start[], purgatory_end[];
+
+int main (void)
+{
+        struct kexec_segment segment = {};
+	int ret;
+
+	segment.buf = purgatory_start;
+	segment.bufsz = purgatory_end - purgatory_start;
+	segment.mem = (void *)0x400000;
+	segment.memsz = 0x1000;
+	ret = syscall(__NR_kexec_load, 0x400000, 1, &segment, KEXEC_PRESERVE_CONTEXT);
+	if (ret) {
+		perror("kexec_load");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	ret = syscall(__NR_reboot, LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC1, LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2, LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC);
+	if (ret) {
+		perror("kexec reboot");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	ret = syscall(__NR_reboot, LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC1, LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2, LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC);
+	if (ret) {
+		perror("kexec reboot");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	printf("Success\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_jump.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_jump.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..6ae977054
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_jump.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Prevent loading a kernel image via the kexec_load syscall when
+# signatures are required.  (Dependent on CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY.)
+
+TEST="$0"
+. ./kexec_common_lib.sh
+
+# kexec requires root privileges
+require_root_privileges
+
+# get the kernel config
+get_kconfig
+
+kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP=y" "kexec_jump is enabled"
+if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+	log_skip "kexec_jump is not enabled"
+fi
+
+kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=y" "IMA enabled"
+ima_appraise=$?
+
+kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y" \
+	"IMA architecture specific policy enabled"
+arch_policy=$?
+
+get_secureboot_mode
+secureboot=$?
+
+if [ $secureboot -eq 1 ] && [ $arch_policy -eq 1 ]; then
+    log_skip "Secure boot and CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY are enabled"
+fi
+
+./test_kexec_jump
+if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+    log_pass "kexec_jump succeeded"
+else
+    # The more likely failure mode if anything went wrong is that the
+    # kernel just crashes. But if we get back here, sure, whine anyway.
+    log_fail "kexec_jump failed"
+fi
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_load.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_load.sh
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..49c6aa929
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kexec/test_kexec_load.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Prevent loading a kernel image via the kexec_load syscall when
+# signatures are required.  (Dependent on CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY.)
+
+TEST="$0"
+. ./kexec_common_lib.sh
+
+# kexec requires root privileges
+require_root_privileges
+
+# get the kernel config
+get_kconfig
+
+kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_KEXEC=y" "kexec_load is enabled"
+if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+	log_skip "kexec_load is not enabled"
+fi
+
+kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=y" "IMA enabled"
+ima_appraise=$?
+
+kconfig_enabled "CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y" \
+	"IMA architecture specific policy enabled"
+arch_policy=$?
+
+get_secureboot_mode
+secureboot=$?
+
+# kexec_load should fail in secure boot mode and CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY enabled
+kexec --load $KERNEL_IMAGE > /dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+	kexec --unload
+	if [ $secureboot -eq 1 ] && [ $arch_policy -eq 1 ]; then
+		log_fail "kexec_load succeeded"
+	elif [ $ima_appraise -eq 0 -o $arch_policy -eq 0 ]; then
+		log_info "Either IMA or the IMA arch policy is not enabled"
+	fi
+	log_pass "kexec_load succeeded"
+else
+	if [ $secureboot -eq 1 ] && [ $arch_policy -eq 1 ] ; then
+		log_pass "kexec_load failed"
+	else
+		log_fail "kexec_load failed"
+	fi
+fi