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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/testing/nvdimm/dax-dev.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/testing/nvdimm/dax-dev.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/testing/nvdimm/dax-dev.c | 39 |
1 files changed, 39 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/nvdimm/dax-dev.c b/tools/testing/nvdimm/dax-dev.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fb342a8c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/nvdimm/dax-dev.c @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation. + */ +#include "test/nfit_test.h" +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include "../../../drivers/dax/dax-private.h" + +phys_addr_t dax_pgoff_to_phys(struct dev_dax *dev_dax, pgoff_t pgoff, + unsigned long size) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < dev_dax->nr_range; i++) { + struct dev_dax_range *dax_range = &dev_dax->ranges[i]; + struct range *range = &dax_range->range; + unsigned long long pgoff_end; + phys_addr_t addr; + + pgoff_end = dax_range->pgoff + PHYS_PFN(range_len(range)) - 1; + if (pgoff < dax_range->pgoff || pgoff > pgoff_end) + continue; + addr = PFN_PHYS(pgoff - dax_range->pgoff) + range->start; + if (addr + size - 1 <= range->end) { + if (get_nfit_res(addr)) { + struct page *page; + + if (dev_dax->region->align > PAGE_SIZE) + return -1; + + page = vmalloc_to_page((void *)addr); + return PFN_PHYS(page_to_pfn(page)); + } + return addr; + } + break; + } + return -1; +} |
