openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 97 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/tools/perf/util/zlib.c b/tools/perf/util/zlib.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1f7c06523
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/zlib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <zlib.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <internal/lib.h>
+
+#include "util/compress.h"
+
+#define CHUNK_SIZE  16384
+
+int gzip_decompress_to_file(const char *input, int output_fd)
+{
+	int ret = Z_STREAM_ERROR;
+	int input_fd;
+	void *ptr;
+	int len;
+	struct stat stbuf;
+	unsigned char buf[CHUNK_SIZE];
+	z_stream zs = {
+		.zalloc		= Z_NULL,
+		.zfree		= Z_NULL,
+		.opaque		= Z_NULL,
+		.avail_in	= 0,
+		.next_in	= Z_NULL,
+	};
+
+	input_fd = open(input, O_RDONLY);
+	if (input_fd < 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (fstat(input_fd, &stbuf) < 0)
+		goto out_close;
+
+	ptr = mmap(NULL, stbuf.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, input_fd, 0);
+	if (ptr == MAP_FAILED)
+		goto out_close;
+
+	if (inflateInit2(&zs, 16 + MAX_WBITS) != Z_OK)
+		goto out_unmap;
+
+	zs.next_in = ptr;
+	zs.avail_in = stbuf.st_size;
+
+	do {
+		zs.next_out = buf;
+		zs.avail_out = CHUNK_SIZE;
+
+		ret = inflate(&zs, Z_NO_FLUSH);
+		switch (ret) {
+		case Z_NEED_DICT:
+			ret = Z_DATA_ERROR;
+			/* fall through */
+		case Z_DATA_ERROR:
+		case Z_MEM_ERROR:
+			goto out;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+
+		len = CHUNK_SIZE - zs.avail_out;
+		if (writen(output_fd, buf, len) != len) {
+			ret = Z_DATA_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+	} while (ret != Z_STREAM_END);
+
+out:
+	inflateEnd(&zs);
+out_unmap:
+	munmap(ptr, stbuf.st_size);
+out_close:
+	close(input_fd);
+
+	return ret == Z_STREAM_END ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+bool gzip_is_compressed(const char *input)
+{
+	int fd = open(input, O_RDONLY);
+	const uint8_t magic[2] = { 0x1f, 0x8b };
+	char buf[2] = { 0 };
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return false;
+
+	rc = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+	close(fd);
+	return rc == sizeof(buf) ?
+	       memcmp(buf, magic, sizeof(buf)) == 0 : false;
+}