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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/units.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/units.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/units.c | 76 |
1 files changed, 76 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/units.c b/tools/perf/util/units.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0bbacf5a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/units.c @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include "units.h" +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/time64.h> + +unsigned long parse_tag_value(const char *str, struct parse_tag *tags) +{ + struct parse_tag *i = tags; + + while (i->tag) { + const char *s = strchr(str, i->tag); + + if (s) { + unsigned long int value; + char *endptr; + + value = strtoul(str, &endptr, 10); + if (s != endptr) + break; + + if (value > ULONG_MAX / i->mult) + break; + value *= i->mult; + return value; + } + i++; + } + + return (unsigned long) -1; +} + +double convert_unit_double(double value, char *unit) +{ + *unit = ' '; + + if (value > 1000.0) { + value /= 1000.0; + *unit = 'K'; + } + + if (value > 1000.0) { + value /= 1000.0; + *unit = 'M'; + } + + if (value > 1000.0) { + value /= 1000.0; + *unit = 'G'; + } + + return value; +} + +unsigned long convert_unit(unsigned long value, char *unit) +{ + double v = convert_unit_double((double)value, unit); + + return (unsigned long)v; +} + +int unit_number__scnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, u64 n) +{ + char unit[] = "BKMG"; + int i = 0; + + while (((n / 1024) > 1) && (i < 3)) { + n /= 1024; + i++; + } + + return scnprintf(buf, size, "%" PRIu64 "%c", n, unit[i]); +} |
