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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /tools/perf/util/units.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/units.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/units.c76
1 files changed, 76 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/units.c b/tools/perf/util/units.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0bbacf5a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/units.c
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include "units.h"
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/time64.h>
+
+unsigned long parse_tag_value(const char *str, struct parse_tag *tags)
+{
+ struct parse_tag *i = tags;
+
+ while (i->tag) {
+ const char *s = strchr(str, i->tag);
+
+ if (s) {
+ unsigned long int value;
+ char *endptr;
+
+ value = strtoul(str, &endptr, 10);
+ if (s != endptr)
+ break;
+
+ if (value > ULONG_MAX / i->mult)
+ break;
+ value *= i->mult;
+ return value;
+ }
+ i++;
+ }
+
+ return (unsigned long) -1;
+}
+
+double convert_unit_double(double value, char *unit)
+{
+ *unit = ' ';
+
+ if (value > 1000.0) {
+ value /= 1000.0;
+ *unit = 'K';
+ }
+
+ if (value > 1000.0) {
+ value /= 1000.0;
+ *unit = 'M';
+ }
+
+ if (value > 1000.0) {
+ value /= 1000.0;
+ *unit = 'G';
+ }
+
+ return value;
+}
+
+unsigned long convert_unit(unsigned long value, char *unit)
+{
+ double v = convert_unit_double((double)value, unit);
+
+ return (unsigned long)v;
+}
+
+int unit_number__scnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, u64 n)
+{
+ char unit[] = "BKMG";
+ int i = 0;
+
+ while (((n / 1024) > 1) && (i < 3)) {
+ n /= 1024;
+ i++;
+ }
+
+ return scnprintf(buf, size, "%" PRIu64 "%c", n, unit[i]);
+}