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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /tools/perf/util/units.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/units.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/units.c | 76 |
1 files changed, 76 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/units.c b/tools/perf/util/units.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0bbacf5a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/units.c @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include "units.h" +#include <inttypes.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/time64.h> + +unsigned long parse_tag_value(const char *str, struct parse_tag *tags) +{ + struct parse_tag *i = tags; + + while (i->tag) { + const char *s = strchr(str, i->tag); + + if (s) { + unsigned long int value; + char *endptr; + + value = strtoul(str, &endptr, 10); + if (s != endptr) + break; + + if (value > ULONG_MAX / i->mult) + break; + value *= i->mult; + return value; + } + i++; + } + + return (unsigned long) -1; +} + +double convert_unit_double(double value, char *unit) +{ + *unit = ' '; + + if (value > 1000.0) { + value /= 1000.0; + *unit = 'K'; + } + + if (value > 1000.0) { + value /= 1000.0; + *unit = 'M'; + } + + if (value > 1000.0) { + value /= 1000.0; + *unit = 'G'; + } + + return value; +} + +unsigned long convert_unit(unsigned long value, char *unit) +{ + double v = convert_unit_double((double)value, unit); + + return (unsigned long)v; +} + +int unit_number__scnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, u64 n) +{ + char unit[] = "BKMG"; + int i = 0; + + while (((n / 1024) > 1) && (i < 3)) { + n /= 1024; + i++; + } + + return scnprintf(buf, size, "%" PRIu64 "%c", n, unit[i]); +} |
