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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/trigger.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/trigger.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/trigger.h | 95 |
1 files changed, 95 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/trigger.h b/tools/perf/util/trigger.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..33e997f9c --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/trigger.h @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __TRIGGER_H_ +#define __TRIGGER_H_ 1 + +#include "asm/bug.h" + +/* + * Use trigger to model operations which need to be executed when + * an event (a signal, for example) is observed. + * + * States and transits: + * + * + * OFF--> ON --> READY --(hit)--> HIT + * ^ | + * | (ready) + * | | + * \_____________/ + * + * is_hit and is_ready are two key functions to query the state of + * a trigger. is_hit means the event already happen; is_ready means the + * trigger is waiting for the event. + */ + +struct trigger { + volatile enum { + TRIGGER_ERROR = -2, + TRIGGER_OFF = -1, + TRIGGER_ON = 0, + TRIGGER_READY = 1, + TRIGGER_HIT = 2, + } state; + const char *name; +}; + +#define TRIGGER_WARN_ONCE(t, exp) \ + WARN_ONCE(t->state != exp, "trigger '%s' state transist error: %d in %s()\n", \ + t->name, t->state, __func__) + +static inline bool trigger_is_available(struct trigger *t) +{ + return t->state >= 0; +} + +static inline bool trigger_is_error(struct trigger *t) +{ + return t->state <= TRIGGER_ERROR; +} + +static inline void trigger_on(struct trigger *t) +{ + TRIGGER_WARN_ONCE(t, TRIGGER_OFF); + t->state = TRIGGER_ON; +} + +static inline void trigger_ready(struct trigger *t) +{ + if (!trigger_is_available(t)) + return; + t->state = TRIGGER_READY; +} + +static inline void trigger_hit(struct trigger *t) +{ + if (!trigger_is_available(t)) + return; + TRIGGER_WARN_ONCE(t, TRIGGER_READY); + t->state = TRIGGER_HIT; +} + +static inline void trigger_off(struct trigger *t) +{ + if (!trigger_is_available(t)) + return; + t->state = TRIGGER_OFF; +} + +static inline void trigger_error(struct trigger *t) +{ + t->state = TRIGGER_ERROR; +} + +static inline bool trigger_is_ready(struct trigger *t) +{ + return t->state == TRIGGER_READY; +} + +static inline bool trigger_is_hit(struct trigger *t) +{ + return t->state == TRIGGER_HIT; +} + +#define DEFINE_TRIGGER(n) \ +struct trigger n = {.state = TRIGGER_OFF, .name = #n} +#endif |
