openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 118 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/tools/perf/util/trace-event.c b/tools/perf/util/trace-event.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6a8c66c64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/trace-event.c
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <event-parse.h>
+#include <api/fs/tracing_path.h>
+#include <api/fs/fs.h>
+#include "trace-event.h"
+#include "machine.h"
+
+/*
+ * global trace_event object used by trace_event__tp_format
+ *
+ * TODO There's no cleanup call for this. Add some sort of
+ * __exit function support and call trace_event__cleanup
+ * there.
+ */
+static struct trace_event tevent;
+static bool tevent_initialized;
+
+int trace_event__init(struct trace_event *t)
+{
+	struct tep_handle *pevent = tep_alloc();
+
+	if (pevent) {
+		t->plugin_list = tep_load_plugins(pevent);
+		t->pevent  = pevent;
+	}
+
+	return pevent ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+static int trace_event__init2(void)
+{
+	int be = tep_is_bigendian();
+	struct tep_handle *pevent;
+
+	if (trace_event__init(&tevent))
+		return -1;
+
+	pevent = tevent.pevent;
+	tep_set_flag(pevent, TEP_NSEC_OUTPUT);
+	tep_set_file_bigendian(pevent, be);
+	tep_set_local_bigendian(pevent, be);
+	tevent_initialized = true;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int trace_event__register_resolver(struct machine *machine,
+				   tep_func_resolver_t *func)
+{
+	if (!tevent_initialized && trace_event__init2())
+		return -1;
+
+	return tep_set_function_resolver(tevent.pevent, func, machine);
+}
+
+void trace_event__cleanup(struct trace_event *t)
+{
+	tep_unload_plugins(t->plugin_list, t->pevent);
+	tep_free(t->pevent);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns pointer with encoded error via <linux/err.h> interface.
+ */
+static struct tep_event*
+tp_format(const char *sys, const char *name)
+{
+	char *tp_dir = get_events_file(sys);
+	struct tep_handle *pevent = tevent.pevent;
+	struct tep_event *event = NULL;
+	char path[PATH_MAX];
+	size_t size;
+	char *data;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!tp_dir)
+		return ERR_PTR(-errno);
+
+	scnprintf(path, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s/format", tp_dir, name);
+	put_events_file(tp_dir);
+
+	err = filename__read_str(path, &data, &size);
+	if (err)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+
+	tep_parse_format(pevent, &event, data, size, sys);
+
+	free(data);
+	return event;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns pointer with encoded error via <linux/err.h> interface.
+ */
+struct tep_event*
+trace_event__tp_format(const char *sys, const char *name)
+{
+	if (!tevent_initialized && trace_event__init2())
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	return tp_format(sys, name);
+}
+
+struct tep_event *trace_event__tp_format_id(int id)
+{
+	if (!tevent_initialized && trace_event__init2())
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	return tep_find_event(tevent.pevent, id);
+}