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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /tools/perf/util/time-utils.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/time-utils.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/time-utils.h | 51 |
1 files changed, 51 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/time-utils.h b/tools/perf/util/time-utils.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1142b0bdd --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/time-utils.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _TIME_UTILS_H_ +#define _TIME_UTILS_H_ + +#include <stddef.h> +#include <time.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +struct perf_time_interval { + u64 start, end; +}; + +int parse_nsec_time(const char *str, u64 *ptime); + +int perf_time__parse_str(struct perf_time_interval *ptime, const char *ostr); + +int perf_time__percent_parse_str(struct perf_time_interval *ptime_buf, int num, + const char *ostr, u64 start, u64 end); + +struct perf_time_interval *perf_time__range_alloc(const char *ostr, int *size); + +bool perf_time__skip_sample(struct perf_time_interval *ptime, u64 timestamp); + +bool perf_time__ranges_skip_sample(struct perf_time_interval *ptime_buf, + int num, u64 timestamp); + +struct perf_session; + +int perf_time__parse_for_ranges_reltime(const char *str, struct perf_session *session, + struct perf_time_interval **ranges, + int *range_size, int *range_num, + bool reltime); + +int perf_time__parse_for_ranges(const char *str, struct perf_session *session, + struct perf_time_interval **ranges, + int *range_size, int *range_num); + +int timestamp__scnprintf_usec(u64 timestamp, char *buf, size_t sz); +int timestamp__scnprintf_nsec(u64 timestamp, char *buf, size_t sz); + +int fetch_current_timestamp(char *buf, size_t sz); + +static inline unsigned long long rdclock(void) +{ + struct timespec ts; + + clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts); + return ts.tv_sec * 1000000000ULL + ts.tv_nsec; +} + +#endif |
