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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/target.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/target.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/target.c | 142 |
1 files changed, 142 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/target.c b/tools/perf/util/target.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8cf71bea2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/target.c @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Helper functions for handling target threads/cpus + * + * Copyright (C) 2012, LG Electronics, Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com> + */ + +#include "target.h" + +#include <pwd.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +enum target_errno target__validate(struct target *target) +{ + enum target_errno ret = TARGET_ERRNO__SUCCESS; + + if (target->pid) + target->tid = target->pid; + + /* CPU and PID are mutually exclusive */ + if (target->tid && target->cpu_list) { + target->cpu_list = NULL; + if (ret == TARGET_ERRNO__SUCCESS) + ret = TARGET_ERRNO__PID_OVERRIDE_CPU; + } + + /* PID and SYSTEM are mutually exclusive */ + if (target->tid && target->system_wide) { + target->system_wide = false; + if (ret == TARGET_ERRNO__SUCCESS) + ret = TARGET_ERRNO__PID_OVERRIDE_SYSTEM; + } + + /* BPF and CPU are mutually exclusive */ + if (target->bpf_str && target->cpu_list) { + target->cpu_list = NULL; + if (ret == TARGET_ERRNO__SUCCESS) + ret = TARGET_ERRNO__BPF_OVERRIDE_CPU; + } + + /* BPF and PID/TID are mutually exclusive */ + if (target->bpf_str && target->tid) { + target->tid = NULL; + if (ret == TARGET_ERRNO__SUCCESS) + ret = TARGET_ERRNO__BPF_OVERRIDE_PID; + } + + /* BPF and THREADS are mutually exclusive */ + if (target->bpf_str && target->per_thread) { + target->per_thread = false; + if (ret == TARGET_ERRNO__SUCCESS) + ret = TARGET_ERRNO__BPF_OVERRIDE_THREAD; + } + + /* THREAD and SYSTEM/CPU are mutually exclusive */ + if (target->per_thread && (target->system_wide || target->cpu_list)) { + target->per_thread = false; + if (ret == TARGET_ERRNO__SUCCESS) + ret = TARGET_ERRNO__SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_THREAD; + } + + return ret; +} + +uid_t parse_uid(const char *str) +{ + struct passwd pwd, *result; + char buf[1024]; + + if (str == NULL) + return UINT_MAX; + + /* Try user name first */ + getpwnam_r(str, &pwd, buf, sizeof(buf), &result); + + if (result == NULL) { + /* + * The user name not found. Maybe it's a UID number. + */ + char *endptr; + int uid = strtol(str, &endptr, 10); + + if (*endptr != '\0') + return UINT_MAX; + + getpwuid_r(uid, &pwd, buf, sizeof(buf), &result); + + if (result == NULL) + return UINT_MAX; + } + + return result->pw_uid; +} + +/* + * This must have a same ordering as the enum target_errno. + */ +static const char *target__error_str[] = { + "PID/TID switch overriding CPU", + "PID/TID switch overriding SYSTEM", + "SYSTEM/CPU switch overriding PER-THREAD", + "BPF switch overriding CPU", + "BPF switch overriding PID/TID", + "BPF switch overriding THREAD", +}; + +int target__strerror(struct target *target __maybe_unused, int errnum, + char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + int idx; + const char *msg; + + BUG_ON(buflen == 0); + + if (errnum >= 0) { + str_error_r(errnum, buf, buflen); + return 0; + } + + if (errnum < __TARGET_ERRNO__START || errnum >= __TARGET_ERRNO__END) + return -1; + + idx = errnum - __TARGET_ERRNO__START; + msg = target__error_str[idx]; + + switch (errnum) { + case TARGET_ERRNO__PID_OVERRIDE_CPU ... + TARGET_ERRNO__BPF_OVERRIDE_THREAD: + snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s", msg); + break; + + default: + /* cannot reach here */ + break; + } + + return 0; +} |
