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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/strbuf.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/strbuf.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/strbuf.c170
1 files changed, 170 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/strbuf.c b/tools/perf/util/strbuf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a64a37628
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/strbuf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include "cache.h"
+#include "debug.h"
+#include "strbuf.h"
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/zalloc.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/*
+ * Used as the default ->buf value, so that people can always assume
+ * buf is non NULL and ->buf is NUL terminated even for a freshly
+ * initialized strbuf.
+ */
+char strbuf_slopbuf[1];
+
+int strbuf_init(struct strbuf *sb, ssize_t hint)
+{
+ sb->alloc = sb->len = 0;
+ sb->buf = strbuf_slopbuf;
+ if (hint)
+ return strbuf_grow(sb, hint);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void strbuf_release(struct strbuf *sb)
+{
+ if (sb->alloc) {
+ zfree(&sb->buf);
+ strbuf_init(sb, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+char *strbuf_detach(struct strbuf *sb, size_t *sz)
+{
+ char *res = sb->alloc ? sb->buf : NULL;
+ if (sz)
+ *sz = sb->len;
+ strbuf_init(sb, 0);
+ return res;
+}
+
+int strbuf_grow(struct strbuf *sb, size_t extra)
+{
+ char *buf;
+ size_t nr = sb->len + extra + 1;
+
+ if (nr < sb->alloc)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (nr <= sb->len)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ if (alloc_nr(sb->alloc) > nr)
+ nr = alloc_nr(sb->alloc);
+
+ /*
+ * Note that sb->buf == strbuf_slopbuf if sb->alloc == 0, and it is
+ * a static variable. Thus we have to avoid passing it to realloc.
+ */
+ buf = realloc(sb->alloc ? sb->buf : NULL, nr * sizeof(*buf));
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ sb->buf = buf;
+ sb->alloc = nr;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int strbuf_addch(struct strbuf *sb, int c)
+{
+ int ret = strbuf_grow(sb, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ sb->buf[sb->len++] = c;
+ sb->buf[sb->len] = '\0';
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int strbuf_add(struct strbuf *sb, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ int ret = strbuf_grow(sb, len);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ memcpy(sb->buf + sb->len, data, len);
+ return strbuf_setlen(sb, sb->len + len);
+}
+
+static int strbuf_addv(struct strbuf *sb, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+ int len, ret;
+ va_list ap_saved;
+
+ if (!strbuf_avail(sb)) {
+ ret = strbuf_grow(sb, 64);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ va_copy(ap_saved, ap);
+ len = vsnprintf(sb->buf + sb->len, sb->alloc - sb->len, fmt, ap);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ va_end(ap_saved);
+ return len;
+ }
+ if (len > strbuf_avail(sb)) {
+ ret = strbuf_grow(sb, len);
+ if (ret) {
+ va_end(ap_saved);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ len = vsnprintf(sb->buf + sb->len, sb->alloc - sb->len, fmt, ap_saved);
+ if (len > strbuf_avail(sb)) {
+ pr_debug("this should not happen, your vsnprintf is broken");
+ va_end(ap_saved);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ va_end(ap_saved);
+ return strbuf_setlen(sb, sb->len + len);
+}
+
+int strbuf_addf(struct strbuf *sb, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ int ret;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ ret = strbuf_addv(sb, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+ssize_t strbuf_read(struct strbuf *sb, int fd, ssize_t hint)
+{
+ size_t oldlen = sb->len;
+ size_t oldalloc = sb->alloc;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = strbuf_grow(sb, hint ? hint : 8192);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ ssize_t cnt;
+
+ cnt = read(fd, sb->buf + sb->len, sb->alloc - sb->len - 1);
+ if (cnt < 0) {
+ if (oldalloc == 0)
+ strbuf_release(sb);
+ else
+ strbuf_setlen(sb, oldlen);
+ return cnt;
+ }
+ if (!cnt)
+ break;
+ sb->len += cnt;
+ ret = strbuf_grow(sb, 8192);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ sb->buf[sb->len] = '\0';
+ return sb->len - oldlen;
+}