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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/rlimit.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/rlimit.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/rlimit.c | 57 |
1 files changed, 57 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/rlimit.c b/tools/perf/util/rlimit.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f857405fe --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/rlimit.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1 */ + +#include <errno.h> +#include "util/debug.h" +#include "util/rlimit.h" +#include <sys/time.h> +#include <sys/resource.h> + +/* + * Bump the memlock so that we can get bpf maps of a reasonable size, + * like the ones used with 'perf trace' and with 'perf test bpf', + * improve this to some specific request if needed. + */ +void rlimit__bump_memlock(void) +{ + struct rlimit rlim; + + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &rlim) == 0) { + rlim.rlim_cur *= 4; + rlim.rlim_max *= 4; + + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &rlim) < 0) { + rlim.rlim_cur /= 2; + rlim.rlim_max /= 2; + + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, &rlim) < 0) + pr_debug("Couldn't bump rlimit(MEMLOCK), failures may take place when creating BPF maps, etc\n"); + } + } +} + +bool rlimit__increase_nofile(enum rlimit_action *set_rlimit) +{ + int old_errno; + struct rlimit l; + + if (*set_rlimit < INCREASED_MAX) { + old_errno = errno; + + if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &l) == 0) { + if (*set_rlimit == NO_CHANGE) { + l.rlim_cur = l.rlim_max; + } else { + l.rlim_cur = l.rlim_max + 1000; + l.rlim_max = l.rlim_cur; + } + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &l) == 0) { + (*set_rlimit) += 1; + errno = old_errno; + return true; + } + } + errno = old_errno; + } + + return false; +} |
