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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/pstack.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/pstack.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/pstack.c | 71 |
1 files changed, 71 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/pstack.c b/tools/perf/util/pstack.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..141ffa129 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/pstack.c @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Simple pointer stack + * + * (c) 2010 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> + */ + +#include "pstack.h" +#include "debug.h" +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/zalloc.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> + +struct pstack { + unsigned short top; + unsigned short max_nr_entries; + void *entries[]; +}; + +struct pstack *pstack__new(unsigned short max_nr_entries) +{ + struct pstack *pstack = zalloc((sizeof(*pstack) + + max_nr_entries * sizeof(void *))); + if (pstack != NULL) + pstack->max_nr_entries = max_nr_entries; + return pstack; +} + +void pstack__delete(struct pstack *pstack) +{ + free(pstack); +} + +bool pstack__empty(const struct pstack *pstack) +{ + return pstack->top == 0; +} + +void pstack__remove(struct pstack *pstack, void *key) +{ + unsigned short i = pstack->top, last_index = pstack->top - 1; + + while (i-- != 0) { + if (pstack->entries[i] == key) { + if (i < last_index) + memmove(pstack->entries + i, + pstack->entries + i + 1, + (last_index - i) * sizeof(void *)); + --pstack->top; + return; + } + } + pr_err("%s: %p not on the pstack!\n", __func__, key); +} + +void pstack__push(struct pstack *pstack, void *key) +{ + if (pstack->top == pstack->max_nr_entries) { + pr_err("%s: top=%d, overflow!\n", __func__, pstack->top); + return; + } + pstack->entries[pstack->top++] = key; +} + +void *pstack__peek(struct pstack *pstack) +{ + if (pstack->top == 0) + return NULL; + return pstack->entries[pstack->top - 1]; +} |
