summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/tools/perf/util/pstack.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/pstack.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/pstack.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/pstack.c71
1 files changed, 71 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/pstack.c b/tools/perf/util/pstack.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..141ffa129
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/pstack.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Simple pointer stack
+ *
+ * (c) 2010 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#include "pstack.h"
+#include "debug.h"
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/zalloc.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+struct pstack {
+ unsigned short top;
+ unsigned short max_nr_entries;
+ void *entries[];
+};
+
+struct pstack *pstack__new(unsigned short max_nr_entries)
+{
+ struct pstack *pstack = zalloc((sizeof(*pstack) +
+ max_nr_entries * sizeof(void *)));
+ if (pstack != NULL)
+ pstack->max_nr_entries = max_nr_entries;
+ return pstack;
+}
+
+void pstack__delete(struct pstack *pstack)
+{
+ free(pstack);
+}
+
+bool pstack__empty(const struct pstack *pstack)
+{
+ return pstack->top == 0;
+}
+
+void pstack__remove(struct pstack *pstack, void *key)
+{
+ unsigned short i = pstack->top, last_index = pstack->top - 1;
+
+ while (i-- != 0) {
+ if (pstack->entries[i] == key) {
+ if (i < last_index)
+ memmove(pstack->entries + i,
+ pstack->entries + i + 1,
+ (last_index - i) * sizeof(void *));
+ --pstack->top;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ pr_err("%s: %p not on the pstack!\n", __func__, key);
+}
+
+void pstack__push(struct pstack *pstack, void *key)
+{
+ if (pstack->top == pstack->max_nr_entries) {
+ pr_err("%s: top=%d, overflow!\n", __func__, pstack->top);
+ return;
+ }
+ pstack->entries[pstack->top++] = key;
+}
+
+void *pstack__peek(struct pstack *pstack)
+{
+ if (pstack->top == 0)
+ return NULL;
+ return pstack->entries[pstack->top - 1];
+}