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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/path.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/path.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/path.c | 79 |
1 files changed, 79 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/path.c b/tools/perf/util/path.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2e62f272f --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/path.c @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include "path.h" +#include "cache.h" +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> +#include <dirent.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +static char *cleanup_path(char *path) +{ + /* Clean it up */ + if (!memcmp(path, "./", 2)) { + path += 2; + while (*path == '/') + path++; + } + return path; +} + +char *mkpath(char *path_buf, size_t sz, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + unsigned len; + + va_start(args, fmt); + len = vsnprintf(path_buf, sz, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + if (len >= sz) + strncpy(path_buf, "/bad-path/", sz); + return cleanup_path(path_buf); +} + +int path__join(char *bf, size_t size, const char *path1, const char *path2) +{ + return scnprintf(bf, size, "%s%s%s", path1, path1[0] ? "/" : "", path2); +} + +int path__join3(char *bf, size_t size, const char *path1, const char *path2, const char *path3) +{ + return scnprintf(bf, size, "%s%s%s%s%s", path1, path1[0] ? "/" : "", + path2, path2[0] ? "/" : "", path3); +} + +bool is_regular_file(const char *file) +{ + struct stat st; + + if (stat(file, &st)) + return false; + + return S_ISREG(st.st_mode); +} + +/* Helper function for filesystems that return a dent->d_type DT_UNKNOWN */ +bool is_directory(const char *base_path, const struct dirent *dent) +{ + char path[PATH_MAX]; + struct stat st; + + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", base_path, dent->d_name); + if (stat(path, &st)) + return false; + + return S_ISDIR(st.st_mode); +} + +bool is_directory_at(int dir_fd, const char *path) +{ + struct stat st; + + if (fstatat(dir_fd, path, &st, /*flags=*/0)) + return false; + + return S_ISDIR(st.st_mode); +} |
