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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/path.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/path.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/path.c79
1 files changed, 79 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/path.c b/tools/perf/util/path.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2e62f272f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/path.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include "path.h"
+#include "cache.h"
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+static char *cleanup_path(char *path)
+{
+ /* Clean it up */
+ if (!memcmp(path, "./", 2)) {
+ path += 2;
+ while (*path == '/')
+ path++;
+ }
+ return path;
+}
+
+char *mkpath(char *path_buf, size_t sz, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ unsigned len;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ len = vsnprintf(path_buf, sz, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ if (len >= sz)
+ strncpy(path_buf, "/bad-path/", sz);
+ return cleanup_path(path_buf);
+}
+
+int path__join(char *bf, size_t size, const char *path1, const char *path2)
+{
+ return scnprintf(bf, size, "%s%s%s", path1, path1[0] ? "/" : "", path2);
+}
+
+int path__join3(char *bf, size_t size, const char *path1, const char *path2, const char *path3)
+{
+ return scnprintf(bf, size, "%s%s%s%s%s", path1, path1[0] ? "/" : "",
+ path2, path2[0] ? "/" : "", path3);
+}
+
+bool is_regular_file(const char *file)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (stat(file, &st))
+ return false;
+
+ return S_ISREG(st.st_mode);
+}
+
+/* Helper function for filesystems that return a dent->d_type DT_UNKNOWN */
+bool is_directory(const char *base_path, const struct dirent *dent)
+{
+ char path[PATH_MAX];
+ struct stat st;
+
+ snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", base_path, dent->d_name);
+ if (stat(path, &st))
+ return false;
+
+ return S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
+}
+
+bool is_directory_at(int dir_fd, const char *path)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (fstatat(dir_fd, path, &st, /*flags=*/0))
+ return false;
+
+ return S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
+}