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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /tools/perf/util/path.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/path.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/path.c79
1 files changed, 79 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/path.c b/tools/perf/util/path.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2e62f272f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/path.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include "path.h"
+#include "cache.h"
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+static char *cleanup_path(char *path)
+{
+ /* Clean it up */
+ if (!memcmp(path, "./", 2)) {
+ path += 2;
+ while (*path == '/')
+ path++;
+ }
+ return path;
+}
+
+char *mkpath(char *path_buf, size_t sz, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ unsigned len;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ len = vsnprintf(path_buf, sz, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ if (len >= sz)
+ strncpy(path_buf, "/bad-path/", sz);
+ return cleanup_path(path_buf);
+}
+
+int path__join(char *bf, size_t size, const char *path1, const char *path2)
+{
+ return scnprintf(bf, size, "%s%s%s", path1, path1[0] ? "/" : "", path2);
+}
+
+int path__join3(char *bf, size_t size, const char *path1, const char *path2, const char *path3)
+{
+ return scnprintf(bf, size, "%s%s%s%s%s", path1, path1[0] ? "/" : "",
+ path2, path2[0] ? "/" : "", path3);
+}
+
+bool is_regular_file(const char *file)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (stat(file, &st))
+ return false;
+
+ return S_ISREG(st.st_mode);
+}
+
+/* Helper function for filesystems that return a dent->d_type DT_UNKNOWN */
+bool is_directory(const char *base_path, const struct dirent *dent)
+{
+ char path[PATH_MAX];
+ struct stat st;
+
+ snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s", base_path, dent->d_name);
+ if (stat(path, &st))
+ return false;
+
+ return S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
+}
+
+bool is_directory_at(int dir_fd, const char *path)
+{
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (fstatat(dir_fd, path, &st, /*flags=*/0))
+ return false;
+
+ return S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
+}