openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 84 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/tools/perf/util/namespaces.h b/tools/perf/util/namespaces.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e95c79b80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/namespaces.h
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Hari Bathini, IBM Corporation
+ */
+
+#ifndef __PERF_NAMESPACES_H
+#define __PERF_NAMESPACES_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <internal/rc_check.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETNS_SUPPORT
+int setns(int fd, int nstype);
+#endif
+
+struct perf_record_namespaces;
+
+struct namespaces {
+	struct list_head list;
+	u64 end_time;
+	struct perf_ns_link_info link_info[];
+};
+
+struct namespaces *namespaces__new(struct perf_record_namespaces *event);
+void namespaces__free(struct namespaces *namespaces);
+
+DECLARE_RC_STRUCT(nsinfo) {
+	pid_t			pid;
+	pid_t			tgid;
+	pid_t			nstgid;
+	bool			need_setns;
+	bool			in_pidns;
+	char			*mntns_path;
+	refcount_t		refcnt;
+};
+
+struct nscookie {
+	int			oldns;
+	int			newns;
+	char			*oldcwd;
+};
+
+int nsinfo__init(struct nsinfo *nsi);
+struct nsinfo *nsinfo__new(pid_t pid);
+struct nsinfo *nsinfo__copy(const struct nsinfo *nsi);
+
+struct nsinfo *nsinfo__get(struct nsinfo *nsi);
+void nsinfo__put(struct nsinfo *nsi);
+
+bool nsinfo__need_setns(const struct nsinfo *nsi);
+void nsinfo__clear_need_setns(struct nsinfo *nsi);
+pid_t nsinfo__tgid(const struct nsinfo  *nsi);
+pid_t nsinfo__nstgid(const struct nsinfo  *nsi);
+pid_t nsinfo__pid(const struct nsinfo  *nsi);
+bool nsinfo__in_pidns(const struct nsinfo  *nsi);
+void nsinfo__set_in_pidns(struct nsinfo *nsi);
+
+void nsinfo__mountns_enter(struct nsinfo *nsi, struct nscookie *nc);
+void nsinfo__mountns_exit(struct nscookie *nc);
+
+char *nsinfo__realpath(const char *path, struct nsinfo *nsi);
+int nsinfo__stat(const char *filename, struct stat *st, struct nsinfo *nsi);
+
+bool nsinfo__is_in_root_namespace(void);
+
+static inline void __nsinfo__zput(struct nsinfo **nsip)
+{
+	if (nsip) {
+		nsinfo__put(*nsip);
+		*nsip = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+#define nsinfo__zput(nsi) __nsinfo__zput(&nsi)
+
+const char *perf_ns__name(unsigned int id);
+
+#endif  /* __PERF_NAMESPACES_H */