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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /tools/perf/util/mem-info.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/mem-info.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/mem-info.c | 48 |
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/mem-info.c b/tools/perf/util/mem-info.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d3efa9c13 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/mem-info.c @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/zalloc.h> +#include "mem-info.h" + +struct mem_info *mem_info__get(struct mem_info *mi) +{ + struct mem_info *result; + + if (RC_CHK_GET(result, mi)) + refcount_inc(mem_info__refcnt(mi)); + + return result; +} + +void mem_info__put(struct mem_info *mi) +{ + if (mi && refcount_dec_and_test(mem_info__refcnt(mi))) { + addr_map_symbol__exit(mem_info__iaddr(mi)); + addr_map_symbol__exit(mem_info__daddr(mi)); + RC_CHK_FREE(mi); + } else { + RC_CHK_PUT(mi); + } +} + +struct mem_info *mem_info__new(void) +{ + struct mem_info *result = NULL; + RC_STRUCT(mem_info) *mi = zalloc(sizeof(*mi)); + + if (ADD_RC_CHK(result, mi)) + refcount_set(mem_info__refcnt(result), 1); + + return result; +} + +struct mem_info *mem_info__clone(struct mem_info *mi) +{ + struct mem_info *result = mem_info__new(); + + if (result) { + addr_map_symbol__copy(mem_info__iaddr(result), mem_info__iaddr(mi)); + addr_map_symbol__copy(mem_info__daddr(result), mem_info__daddr(mi)); + mem_info__data_src(result)->val = mem_info__data_src(mi)->val; + } + + return result; +} |
