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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /tools/perf/util/mem-info.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/mem-info.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/mem-info.c48
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/mem-info.c b/tools/perf/util/mem-info.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d3efa9c13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/mem-info.c
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/zalloc.h>
+#include "mem-info.h"
+
+struct mem_info *mem_info__get(struct mem_info *mi)
+{
+ struct mem_info *result;
+
+ if (RC_CHK_GET(result, mi))
+ refcount_inc(mem_info__refcnt(mi));
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+void mem_info__put(struct mem_info *mi)
+{
+ if (mi && refcount_dec_and_test(mem_info__refcnt(mi))) {
+ addr_map_symbol__exit(mem_info__iaddr(mi));
+ addr_map_symbol__exit(mem_info__daddr(mi));
+ RC_CHK_FREE(mi);
+ } else {
+ RC_CHK_PUT(mi);
+ }
+}
+
+struct mem_info *mem_info__new(void)
+{
+ struct mem_info *result = NULL;
+ RC_STRUCT(mem_info) *mi = zalloc(sizeof(*mi));
+
+ if (ADD_RC_CHK(result, mi))
+ refcount_set(mem_info__refcnt(result), 1);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+struct mem_info *mem_info__clone(struct mem_info *mi)
+{
+ struct mem_info *result = mem_info__new();
+
+ if (result) {
+ addr_map_symbol__copy(mem_info__iaddr(result), mem_info__iaddr(mi));
+ addr_map_symbol__copy(mem_info__daddr(result), mem_info__daddr(mi));
+ mem_info__data_src(result)->val = mem_info__data_src(mi)->val;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}