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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /tools/perf/util/lock-contention.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/lock-contention.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/lock-contention.c | 143 |
1 files changed, 143 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/lock-contention.c b/tools/perf/util/lock-contention.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..119a7206f --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/lock-contention.c @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include "debug.h" +#include "env.h" +#include "lock-contention.h" +#include "machine.h" +#include "symbol.h" + +#include <limits.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <linux/hash.h> +#include <linux/zalloc.h> + +#define __lockhashfn(key) hash_long((unsigned long)key, LOCKHASH_BITS) +#define lockhashentry(key) (lockhash_table + __lockhashfn((key))) + +struct callstack_filter { + struct list_head list; + char name[]; +}; + +static LIST_HEAD(callstack_filters); +struct hlist_head *lockhash_table; + +int parse_call_stack(const struct option *opt __maybe_unused, const char *str, + int unset __maybe_unused) +{ + char *s, *tmp, *tok; + int ret = 0; + + s = strdup(str); + if (s == NULL) + return -1; + + for (tok = strtok_r(s, ", ", &tmp); tok; tok = strtok_r(NULL, ", ", &tmp)) { + struct callstack_filter *entry; + + entry = malloc(sizeof(*entry) + strlen(tok) + 1); + if (entry == NULL) { + pr_err("Memory allocation failure\n"); + free(s); + return -1; + } + + strcpy(entry->name, tok); + list_add_tail(&entry->list, &callstack_filters); + } + + free(s); + return ret; +} + +bool needs_callstack(void) +{ + return !list_empty(&callstack_filters); +} + +struct lock_stat *lock_stat_find(u64 addr) +{ + struct hlist_head *entry = lockhashentry(addr); + struct lock_stat *ret; + + hlist_for_each_entry(ret, entry, hash_entry) { + if (ret->addr == addr) + return ret; + } + return NULL; +} + +struct lock_stat *lock_stat_findnew(u64 addr, const char *name, int flags) +{ + struct hlist_head *entry = lockhashentry(addr); + struct lock_stat *ret, *new; + + hlist_for_each_entry(ret, entry, hash_entry) { + if (ret->addr == addr) + return ret; + } + + new = zalloc(sizeof(struct lock_stat)); + if (!new) + goto alloc_failed; + + new->addr = addr; + new->name = strdup(name); + if (!new->name) { + free(new); + goto alloc_failed; + } + + new->flags = flags; + new->wait_time_min = ULLONG_MAX; + + hlist_add_head(&new->hash_entry, entry); + return new; + +alloc_failed: + pr_err("memory allocation failed\n"); + return NULL; +} + +bool match_callstack_filter(struct machine *machine, u64 *callstack, int max_stack_depth) +{ + struct map *kmap; + struct symbol *sym; + u64 ip; + uint16_t e_machine = perf_env__e_machine(machine->env, /*e_flags=*/NULL); + bool is_powerpc = e_machine == EM_PPC64 || e_machine == EM_PPC; + + if (list_empty(&callstack_filters)) + return true; + + for (int i = 0; i < max_stack_depth; i++) { + struct callstack_filter *filter; + + /* + * In powerpc, the callchain saved by kernel always includes + * first three entries as the NIP (next instruction pointer), + * LR (link register), and the contents of LR save area in the + * second stack frame. In certain scenarios its possible to have + * invalid kernel instruction addresses in either LR or the second + * stack frame's LR. In that case, kernel will store that address as + * zero. + * + * The below check will continue to look into callstack, + * incase first or second callstack index entry has 0 + * address for powerpc. + */ + if (!callstack || (!callstack[i] && (!is_powerpc || (i != 1 && i != 2)))) + break; + + ip = callstack[i]; + sym = machine__find_kernel_symbol(machine, ip, &kmap); + if (sym == NULL) + continue; + + list_for_each_entry(filter, &callstack_filters, list) { + if (strstr(sym->name, filter->name)) + return true; + } + } + return false; +} |
