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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /tools/perf/util/ftrace.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/ftrace.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/ftrace.h | 96 |
1 files changed, 96 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/ftrace.h b/tools/perf/util/ftrace.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..950f2efaf --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/ftrace.h @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +#ifndef __PERF_FTRACE_H__ +#define __PERF_FTRACE_H__ + +#include <linux/list.h> + +#include "target.h" + +struct evlist; +struct hashamp; +struct stats; + +struct perf_ftrace { + struct evlist *evlist; + struct target target; + const char *tracer; + struct list_head filters; + struct list_head notrace; + struct list_head graph_funcs; + struct list_head nograph_funcs; + struct list_head event_pair; + struct hashmap *profile_hash; + unsigned long percpu_buffer_size; + bool inherit; + bool use_nsec; + unsigned int bucket_range; + unsigned int min_latency; + unsigned int max_latency; + unsigned int bucket_num; + bool hide_empty; + int graph_depth; + int func_stack_trace; + int func_irq_info; + int graph_args; + int graph_retval; + int graph_retval_hex; + int graph_retaddr; + int graph_nosleep_time; + int graph_noirqs; + int graph_verbose; + int graph_thresh; + int graph_tail; +}; + +struct filter_entry { + struct list_head list; + char name[]; +}; + +#define NUM_BUCKET 22 /* 20 + 2 (for outliers in both direction) */ + +#ifdef HAVE_BPF_SKEL + +int perf_ftrace__latency_prepare_bpf(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace); +int perf_ftrace__latency_start_bpf(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace); +int perf_ftrace__latency_stop_bpf(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace); +int perf_ftrace__latency_read_bpf(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace, + int buckets[], struct stats *stats); +int perf_ftrace__latency_cleanup_bpf(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace); + +#else /* !HAVE_BPF_SKEL */ + +static inline int +perf_ftrace__latency_prepare_bpf(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace __maybe_unused) +{ + return -1; +} + +static inline int +perf_ftrace__latency_start_bpf(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace __maybe_unused) +{ + return -1; +} + +static inline int +perf_ftrace__latency_stop_bpf(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace __maybe_unused) +{ + return -1; +} + +static inline int +perf_ftrace__latency_read_bpf(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace __maybe_unused, + int buckets[] __maybe_unused, + struct stats *stats __maybe_unused) +{ + return -1; +} + +static inline int +perf_ftrace__latency_cleanup_bpf(struct perf_ftrace *ftrace __maybe_unused) +{ + return -1; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_BPF_SKEL */ + +#endif /* __PERF_FTRACE_H__ */ |
