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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/demangle-ocaml.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/demangle-ocaml.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/demangle-ocaml.c68
1 files changed, 68 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/demangle-ocaml.c b/tools/perf/util/demangle-ocaml.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9d707bb60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/demangle-ocaml.c
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "util/string2.h"
+
+#include "demangle-ocaml.h"
+
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+
+static const char *caml_prefix = "caml";
+static const size_t caml_prefix_len = 4;
+
+/* mangled OCaml symbols start with "caml" followed by an upper-case letter */
+static bool
+ocaml_is_mangled(const char *sym)
+{
+ return 0 == strncmp(sym, caml_prefix, caml_prefix_len)
+ && isupper(sym[caml_prefix_len]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * input:
+ * sym: a symbol which may have been mangled by the OCaml compiler
+ * return:
+ * if the input doesn't look like a mangled OCaml symbol, NULL is returned
+ * otherwise, a newly allocated string containing the demangled symbol is returned
+ */
+char *
+ocaml_demangle_sym(const char *sym)
+{
+ char *result;
+ int j = 0;
+ int i;
+ int len;
+
+ if (!ocaml_is_mangled(sym)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ len = strlen(sym);
+
+ /* the demangled symbol is always smaller than the mangled symbol */
+ result = malloc(len + 1);
+ if (!result)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* skip "caml" prefix */
+ i = caml_prefix_len;
+
+ while (i < len) {
+ if (sym[i] == '_' && sym[i + 1] == '_') {
+ /* "__" -> "." */
+ result[j++] = '.';
+ i += 2;
+ }
+ else if (sym[i] == '$' && isxdigit(sym[i + 1]) && isxdigit(sym[i + 2])) {
+ /* "$xx" is a hex-encoded character */
+ result[j++] = (hex(sym[i + 1]) << 4) | hex(sym[i + 2]);
+ i += 3;
+ }
+ else {
+ result[j++] = sym[i++];
+ }
+ }
+ result[j] = '\0';
+
+ return result;
+}