staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 71 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/tools/perf/util/counts.c b/tools/perf/util/counts.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..11cd85b27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/counts.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "evsel.h"
+#include "counts.h"
+#include <perf/threadmap.h>
+#include <linux/zalloc.h>
+
+struct perf_counts *perf_counts__new(int ncpus, int nthreads)
+{
+	struct perf_counts *counts = zalloc(sizeof(*counts));
+
+	if (counts) {
+		struct xyarray *values;
+
+		values = xyarray__new(ncpus, nthreads, sizeof(struct perf_counts_values));
+		if (!values) {
+			free(counts);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		counts->values = values;
+
+		values = xyarray__new(ncpus, nthreads, sizeof(bool));
+		if (!values) {
+			xyarray__delete(counts->values);
+			free(counts);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+
+		counts->loaded = values;
+	}
+
+	return counts;
+}
+
+void perf_counts__delete(struct perf_counts *counts)
+{
+	if (counts) {
+		xyarray__delete(counts->loaded);
+		xyarray__delete(counts->values);
+		free(counts);
+	}
+}
+
+void perf_counts__reset(struct perf_counts *counts)
+{
+	xyarray__reset(counts->loaded);
+	xyarray__reset(counts->values);
+}
+
+void evsel__reset_counts(struct evsel *evsel)
+{
+	perf_counts__reset(evsel->counts);
+}
+
+int evsel__alloc_counts(struct evsel *evsel)
+{
+	struct perf_cpu_map *cpus = evsel__cpus(evsel);
+	int nthreads = perf_thread_map__nr(evsel->core.threads);
+
+	evsel->counts = perf_counts__new(perf_cpu_map__nr(cpus), nthreads);
+	return evsel->counts != NULL ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+void evsel__free_counts(struct evsel *evsel)
+{
+	perf_counts__delete(evsel->counts);
+	evsel->counts = NULL;
+}