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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /tools/perf/util/counts.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/counts.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/counts.c71
1 files changed, 71 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/counts.c b/tools/perf/util/counts.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..11cd85b27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/counts.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "evsel.h"
+#include "counts.h"
+#include <perf/threadmap.h>
+#include <linux/zalloc.h>
+
+struct perf_counts *perf_counts__new(int ncpus, int nthreads)
+{
+ struct perf_counts *counts = zalloc(sizeof(*counts));
+
+ if (counts) {
+ struct xyarray *values;
+
+ values = xyarray__new(ncpus, nthreads, sizeof(struct perf_counts_values));
+ if (!values) {
+ free(counts);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ counts->values = values;
+
+ values = xyarray__new(ncpus, nthreads, sizeof(bool));
+ if (!values) {
+ xyarray__delete(counts->values);
+ free(counts);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ counts->loaded = values;
+ }
+
+ return counts;
+}
+
+void perf_counts__delete(struct perf_counts *counts)
+{
+ if (counts) {
+ xyarray__delete(counts->loaded);
+ xyarray__delete(counts->values);
+ free(counts);
+ }
+}
+
+void perf_counts__reset(struct perf_counts *counts)
+{
+ xyarray__reset(counts->loaded);
+ xyarray__reset(counts->values);
+}
+
+void evsel__reset_counts(struct evsel *evsel)
+{
+ perf_counts__reset(evsel->counts);
+}
+
+int evsel__alloc_counts(struct evsel *evsel)
+{
+ struct perf_cpu_map *cpus = evsel__cpus(evsel);
+ int nthreads = perf_thread_map__nr(evsel->core.threads);
+
+ evsel->counts = perf_counts__new(perf_cpu_map__nr(cpus), nthreads);
+ return evsel->counts != NULL ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+void evsel__free_counts(struct evsel *evsel)
+{
+ perf_counts__delete(evsel->counts);
+ evsel->counts = NULL;
+}