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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/cloexec.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/cloexec.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/cloexec.c92
1 files changed, 92 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8830604c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include "util.h" // for sched_getcpu()
+#include "../perf-sys.h"
+#include "cloexec.h"
+#include "event.h"
+#include "asm/bug.h"
+#include "debug.h"
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+static unsigned long flag = PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC;
+
+static int perf_flag_probe(void)
+{
+ /* use 'safest' configuration as used in evsel__fallback() */
+ struct perf_event_attr attr = {
+ .type = PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE,
+ .config = PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK,
+ .exclude_kernel = 1,
+ };
+ int fd;
+ int err;
+ int cpu;
+ pid_t pid = -1;
+ char sbuf[STRERR_BUFSIZE];
+
+ cpu = sched_getcpu();
+ if (cpu < 0)
+ cpu = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Using -1 for the pid is a workaround to avoid gratuitous jump label
+ * changes.
+ */
+ while (1) {
+ /* check cloexec flag */
+ fd = sys_perf_event_open(&attr, pid, cpu, -1,
+ PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0 && pid == -1 && errno == EACCES) {
+ pid = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ err = errno;
+
+ if (fd >= 0) {
+ close(fd);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES,
+ "perf_event_open(..., PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC) failed with unexpected error %d (%s)\n",
+ err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)));
+
+ /* not supported, confirm error related to PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC */
+ while (1) {
+ fd = sys_perf_event_open(&attr, pid, cpu, -1, 0);
+ if (fd < 0 && pid == -1 && errno == EACCES) {
+ pid = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ err = errno;
+
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
+
+ if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES,
+ "perf_event_open(..., 0) failed unexpectedly with error %d (%s)\n",
+ err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf))))
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+unsigned long perf_event_open_cloexec_flag(void)
+{
+ static bool probed;
+
+ if (!probed) {
+ if (perf_flag_probe() <= 0)
+ flag = 0;
+ probed = true;
+ }
+
+ return flag;
+}