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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/cloexec.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/cloexec.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/cloexec.c | 92 |
1 files changed, 92 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8830604c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <errno.h> +#include <sched.h> +#include "util.h" // for sched_getcpu() +#include "../perf-sys.h" +#include "cloexec.h" +#include "event.h" +#include "asm/bug.h" +#include "debug.h" +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/syscall.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +static unsigned long flag = PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC; + +static int perf_flag_probe(void) +{ + /* use 'safest' configuration as used in evsel__fallback() */ + struct perf_event_attr attr = { + .type = PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE, + .config = PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK, + .exclude_kernel = 1, + }; + int fd; + int err; + int cpu; + pid_t pid = -1; + char sbuf[STRERR_BUFSIZE]; + + cpu = sched_getcpu(); + if (cpu < 0) + cpu = 0; + + /* + * Using -1 for the pid is a workaround to avoid gratuitous jump label + * changes. + */ + while (1) { + /* check cloexec flag */ + fd = sys_perf_event_open(&attr, pid, cpu, -1, + PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0 && pid == -1 && errno == EACCES) { + pid = 0; + continue; + } + break; + } + err = errno; + + if (fd >= 0) { + close(fd); + return 1; + } + + WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES, + "perf_event_open(..., PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC) failed with unexpected error %d (%s)\n", + err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf))); + + /* not supported, confirm error related to PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC */ + while (1) { + fd = sys_perf_event_open(&attr, pid, cpu, -1, 0); + if (fd < 0 && pid == -1 && errno == EACCES) { + pid = 0; + continue; + } + break; + } + err = errno; + + if (fd >= 0) + close(fd); + + if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES, + "perf_event_open(..., 0) failed unexpectedly with error %d (%s)\n", + err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)))) + return -1; + + return 0; +} + +unsigned long perf_event_open_cloexec_flag(void) +{ + static bool probed; + + if (!probed) { + if (perf_flag_probe() <= 0) + flag = 0; + probed = true; + } + + return flag; +} |
