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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /tools/perf/util/cloexec.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/cloexec.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/cloexec.c | 92 |
1 files changed, 92 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8830604c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/cloexec.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <errno.h> +#include <sched.h> +#include "util.h" // for sched_getcpu() +#include "../perf-sys.h" +#include "cloexec.h" +#include "event.h" +#include "asm/bug.h" +#include "debug.h" +#include <unistd.h> +#include <sys/syscall.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +static unsigned long flag = PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC; + +static int perf_flag_probe(void) +{ + /* use 'safest' configuration as used in evsel__fallback() */ + struct perf_event_attr attr = { + .type = PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE, + .config = PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK, + .exclude_kernel = 1, + }; + int fd; + int err; + int cpu; + pid_t pid = -1; + char sbuf[STRERR_BUFSIZE]; + + cpu = sched_getcpu(); + if (cpu < 0) + cpu = 0; + + /* + * Using -1 for the pid is a workaround to avoid gratuitous jump label + * changes. + */ + while (1) { + /* check cloexec flag */ + fd = sys_perf_event_open(&attr, pid, cpu, -1, + PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0 && pid == -1 && errno == EACCES) { + pid = 0; + continue; + } + break; + } + err = errno; + + if (fd >= 0) { + close(fd); + return 1; + } + + WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES, + "perf_event_open(..., PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC) failed with unexpected error %d (%s)\n", + err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf))); + + /* not supported, confirm error related to PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC */ + while (1) { + fd = sys_perf_event_open(&attr, pid, cpu, -1, 0); + if (fd < 0 && pid == -1 && errno == EACCES) { + pid = 0; + continue; + } + break; + } + err = errno; + + if (fd >= 0) + close(fd); + + if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES, + "perf_event_open(..., 0) failed unexpectedly with error %d (%s)\n", + err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)))) + return -1; + + return 0; +} + +unsigned long perf_event_open_cloexec_flag(void) +{ + static bool probed; + + if (!probed) { + if (perf_flag_probe() <= 0) + flag = 0; + probed = true; + } + + return flag; +} |
