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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /tools/perf/util/cgroup.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/cgroup.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/cgroup.h | 58 |
1 files changed, 58 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cgroup.h b/tools/perf/util/cgroup.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7b1bda228 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/cgroup.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __CGROUP_H__ +#define __CGROUP_H__ + +#include <linux/compiler.h> +#include <linux/refcount.h> +#include <linux/rbtree.h> +#include "util/env.h" + +struct option; + +struct cgroup { + struct rb_node node; + u64 id; + char *name; + int fd; + refcount_t refcnt; +}; + +extern int nr_cgroups; /* number of explicit cgroups defined */ +extern bool cgrp_event_expanded; + +struct cgroup *cgroup__get(struct cgroup *cgroup); +void cgroup__put(struct cgroup *cgroup); + +struct evlist; +struct rblist; + +struct cgroup *cgroup__new(const char *name, bool do_open); +struct cgroup *evlist__findnew_cgroup(struct evlist *evlist, const char *name); +int evlist__expand_cgroup(struct evlist *evlist, const char *cgroups, bool open_cgroup); + +void evlist__set_default_cgroup(struct evlist *evlist, struct cgroup *cgroup); + +int parse_cgroups(const struct option *opt, const char *str, int unset); + +struct cgroup *cgroup__findnew(struct perf_env *env, uint64_t id, + const char *path); +struct cgroup *cgroup__find(struct perf_env *env, uint64_t id); +struct cgroup *__cgroup__find(struct rb_root *root, uint64_t id); + +void perf_env__purge_cgroups(struct perf_env *env); + +#ifdef HAVE_FILE_HANDLE +int read_cgroup_id(struct cgroup *cgrp); +#else +static inline int read_cgroup_id(struct cgroup *cgrp __maybe_unused) +{ + return -1; +} +#endif /* HAVE_FILE_HANDLE */ + +/* read all cgroups in the system and save them in the rbtree */ +void read_all_cgroups(struct rb_root *root); + +int cgroup_is_v2(const char *subsys); + +#endif /* __CGROUP_H__ */ |
