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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/cap.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/cap.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/cap.c | 46 |
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cap.c b/tools/perf/util/cap.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..272bd8255 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/cap.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Capability utilities + */ + +#include "cap.h" +#include "debug.h" +#include <errno.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <sys/syscall.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#define MAX_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3 + +bool perf_cap__capable(int cap) +{ + struct __user_cap_header_struct header = { + .version = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, + .pid = 0, + }; + struct __user_cap_data_struct data[MAX_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S] = {}; + __u32 cap_val; + + while (syscall(SYS_capget, &header, &data[0]) == -1) { + /* Retry, first attempt has set the header.version correctly. */ + if (errno == EINVAL && header.version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3 && + header.version == _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1) + continue; + + pr_debug2("capget syscall failed (%m) fall back on root check\n"); + return geteuid() == 0; + } + + /* Extract the relevant capability bit. */ + if (cap >= 32) { + if (header.version == _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3) { + cap_val = data[1].effective; + } else { + /* Capability beyond 32 is requested but only 32 are supported. */ + return false; + } + } else { + cap_val = data[0].effective; + } + return (cap_val & (1 << (cap & 0x1f))) != 0; +} |
