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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/cap.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/cap.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/cap.c46
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/cap.c b/tools/perf/util/cap.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..272bd8255
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/cap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Capability utilities
+ */
+
+#include "cap.h"
+#include "debug.h"
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#define MAX_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
+
+bool perf_cap__capable(int cap)
+{
+ struct __user_cap_header_struct header = {
+ .version = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3,
+ .pid = 0,
+ };
+ struct __user_cap_data_struct data[MAX_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S] = {};
+ __u32 cap_val;
+
+ while (syscall(SYS_capget, &header, &data[0]) == -1) {
+ /* Retry, first attempt has set the header.version correctly. */
+ if (errno == EINVAL && header.version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3 &&
+ header.version == _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1)
+ continue;
+
+ pr_debug2("capget syscall failed (%m) fall back on root check\n");
+ return geteuid() == 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Extract the relevant capability bit. */
+ if (cap >= 32) {
+ if (header.version == _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3) {
+ cap_val = data[1].effective;
+ } else {
+ /* Capability beyond 32 is requested but only 32 are supported. */
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ cap_val = data[0].effective;
+ }
+ return (cap_val & (1 << (cap & 0x1f))) != 0;
+}