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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/block-range.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/block-range.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/block-range.h | 76 |
1 files changed, 76 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/block-range.h b/tools/perf/util/block-range.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ec0fb534b --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/block-range.h @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __PERF_BLOCK_RANGE_H +#define __PERF_BLOCK_RANGE_H + +#include <stdbool.h> +#include <linux/rbtree.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +struct symbol; + +/* + * struct block_range - non-overlapping parts of basic blocks + * @node: treenode + * @start: inclusive start of range + * @end: inclusive end of range + * @is_target: @start is a jump target + * @is_branch: @end is a branch instruction + * @coverage: number of blocks that cover this range + * @taken: number of times the branch is taken (requires @is_branch) + * @pred: number of times the taken branch was predicted + */ +struct block_range { + struct rb_node node; + + struct symbol *sym; + + u64 start; + u64 end; + + int is_target, is_branch; + + u64 coverage; + u64 entry; + u64 taken; + u64 pred; +}; + +static inline struct block_range *block_range__next(struct block_range *br) +{ + struct rb_node *n = rb_next(&br->node); + if (!n) + return NULL; + return rb_entry(n, struct block_range, node); +} + +struct block_range_iter { + struct block_range *start; + struct block_range *end; +}; + +static inline struct block_range *block_range_iter(struct block_range_iter *iter) +{ + return iter->start; +} + +static inline bool block_range_iter__next(struct block_range_iter *iter) +{ + if (iter->start == iter->end) + return false; + + iter->start = block_range__next(iter->start); + return true; +} + +static inline bool block_range_iter__valid(struct block_range_iter *iter) +{ + if (!iter->start || !iter->end) + return false; + return true; +} + +extern struct block_range *block_range__find(u64 addr); +extern struct block_range_iter block_range__create(u64 start, u64 end); +extern double block_range__coverage(struct block_range *br); + +#endif /* __PERF_BLOCK_RANGE_H */ |
