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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/block-range.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/block-range.h')
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/util/block-range.h76
1 files changed, 76 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/block-range.h b/tools/perf/util/block-range.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ec0fb534b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/util/block-range.h
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __PERF_BLOCK_RANGE_H
+#define __PERF_BLOCK_RANGE_H
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <linux/rbtree.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct symbol;
+
+/*
+ * struct block_range - non-overlapping parts of basic blocks
+ * @node: treenode
+ * @start: inclusive start of range
+ * @end: inclusive end of range
+ * @is_target: @start is a jump target
+ * @is_branch: @end is a branch instruction
+ * @coverage: number of blocks that cover this range
+ * @taken: number of times the branch is taken (requires @is_branch)
+ * @pred: number of times the taken branch was predicted
+ */
+struct block_range {
+ struct rb_node node;
+
+ struct symbol *sym;
+
+ u64 start;
+ u64 end;
+
+ int is_target, is_branch;
+
+ u64 coverage;
+ u64 entry;
+ u64 taken;
+ u64 pred;
+};
+
+static inline struct block_range *block_range__next(struct block_range *br)
+{
+ struct rb_node *n = rb_next(&br->node);
+ if (!n)
+ return NULL;
+ return rb_entry(n, struct block_range, node);
+}
+
+struct block_range_iter {
+ struct block_range *start;
+ struct block_range *end;
+};
+
+static inline struct block_range *block_range_iter(struct block_range_iter *iter)
+{
+ return iter->start;
+}
+
+static inline bool block_range_iter__next(struct block_range_iter *iter)
+{
+ if (iter->start == iter->end)
+ return false;
+
+ iter->start = block_range__next(iter->start);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool block_range_iter__valid(struct block_range_iter *iter)
+{
+ if (!iter->start || !iter->end)
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
+extern struct block_range *block_range__find(u64 addr);
+extern struct block_range_iter block_range__create(u64 start, u64 end);
+extern double block_range__coverage(struct block_range *br);
+
+#endif /* __PERF_BLOCK_RANGE_H */