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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/util/blake2s.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/util/blake2s.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/util/blake2s.h | 73 |
1 files changed, 73 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/util/blake2s.h b/tools/perf/util/blake2s.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a1fe81a4b --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/util/blake2s.h @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved. + */ + +#ifndef _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H +#define _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H + +#include <string.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +#define BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE 64 + +struct blake2s_ctx { + u32 h[8]; + u32 t[2]; + u32 f[2]; + u8 buf[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE]; + unsigned int buflen; + unsigned int outlen; +}; + +enum blake2s_iv { + BLAKE2S_IV0 = 0x6A09E667UL, + BLAKE2S_IV1 = 0xBB67AE85UL, + BLAKE2S_IV2 = 0x3C6EF372UL, + BLAKE2S_IV3 = 0xA54FF53AUL, + BLAKE2S_IV4 = 0x510E527FUL, + BLAKE2S_IV5 = 0x9B05688CUL, + BLAKE2S_IV6 = 0x1F83D9ABUL, + BLAKE2S_IV7 = 0x5BE0CD19UL, +}; + +static inline void __blake2s_init(struct blake2s_ctx *ctx, size_t outlen, + const void *key, size_t keylen) +{ + ctx->h[0] = BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | keylen << 8 | outlen); + ctx->h[1] = BLAKE2S_IV1; + ctx->h[2] = BLAKE2S_IV2; + ctx->h[3] = BLAKE2S_IV3; + ctx->h[4] = BLAKE2S_IV4; + ctx->h[5] = BLAKE2S_IV5; + ctx->h[6] = BLAKE2S_IV6; + ctx->h[7] = BLAKE2S_IV7; + ctx->t[0] = 0; + ctx->t[1] = 0; + ctx->f[0] = 0; + ctx->f[1] = 0; + ctx->buflen = 0; + ctx->outlen = outlen; + if (keylen) { + memcpy(ctx->buf, key, keylen); + memset(&ctx->buf[keylen], 0, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - keylen); + ctx->buflen = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; + } +} + +static inline void blake2s_init(struct blake2s_ctx *ctx, size_t outlen) +{ + __blake2s_init(ctx, outlen, NULL, 0); +} + +static inline void blake2s_init_key(struct blake2s_ctx *ctx, size_t outlen, + const void *key, size_t keylen) +{ + __blake2s_init(ctx, outlen, key, keylen); +} + +void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in, size_t inlen); + +void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_ctx *ctx, u8 *out); + +#endif /* _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H */ |
