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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/ui/util.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/ui/util.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/ui/util.h | 24 |
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/ui/util.h b/tools/perf/ui/util.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e30cea807 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/ui/util.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _PERF_UI_UTIL_H_ +#define _PERF_UI_UTIL_H_ 1 + +#include <stdarg.h> + +int ui__getch(int delay_secs); +int ui__popup_menu(int argc, char * const argv[], int *keyp); +int ui__help_window(const char *text); +int ui__dialog_yesno(const char *msg); +void __ui__info_window(const char *title, const char *text, const char *exit_msg); +void ui__info_window(const char *title, const char *text); +int ui__question_window(const char *title, const char *text, + const char *exit_msg, int delay_secs); + +struct perf_error_ops { + int (*error)(const char *format, va_list args); + int (*warning)(const char *format, va_list args); +}; + +int perf_error__register(struct perf_error_ops *eops); +int perf_error__unregister(struct perf_error_ops *eops); + +#endif /* _PERF_UI_UTIL_H_ */ |
