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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/ui/progress.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/ui/progress.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/ui/progress.c47
1 files changed, 47 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/ui/progress.c b/tools/perf/ui/progress.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..99d60223c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/ui/progress.c
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include "progress.h"
+
+static void null_progress__update(struct ui_progress *p __maybe_unused)
+{
+}
+
+static struct ui_progress_ops null_progress__ops =
+{
+ .update = null_progress__update,
+};
+
+struct ui_progress_ops *ui_progress__ops = &null_progress__ops;
+
+void ui_progress__update(struct ui_progress *p, u64 adv)
+{
+ u64 last = p->curr;
+
+ p->curr += adv;
+
+ if (p->curr >= p->next) {
+ u64 nr = DIV_ROUND_UP(p->curr - last, p->step);
+
+ p->next += nr * p->step;
+ ui_progress__ops->update(p);
+ }
+}
+
+void __ui_progress__init(struct ui_progress *p, u64 total,
+ const char *title, bool size)
+{
+ p->curr = 0;
+ p->next = p->step = total / 16 ?: 1;
+ p->total = total;
+ p->title = title;
+ p->size = size;
+
+ if (ui_progress__ops->init)
+ ui_progress__ops->init(p);
+}
+
+void ui_progress__finish(void)
+{
+ if (ui_progress__ops->finish)
+ ui_progress__ops->finish();
+}