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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /tools/perf/ui/progress.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/ui/progress.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/ui/progress.c | 47 |
1 files changed, 47 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/ui/progress.c b/tools/perf/ui/progress.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..99d60223c --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/ui/progress.c @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include "progress.h" + +static void null_progress__update(struct ui_progress *p __maybe_unused) +{ +} + +static struct ui_progress_ops null_progress__ops = +{ + .update = null_progress__update, +}; + +struct ui_progress_ops *ui_progress__ops = &null_progress__ops; + +void ui_progress__update(struct ui_progress *p, u64 adv) +{ + u64 last = p->curr; + + p->curr += adv; + + if (p->curr >= p->next) { + u64 nr = DIV_ROUND_UP(p->curr - last, p->step); + + p->next += nr * p->step; + ui_progress__ops->update(p); + } +} + +void __ui_progress__init(struct ui_progress *p, u64 total, + const char *title, bool size) +{ + p->curr = 0; + p->next = p->step = total / 16 ?: 1; + p->total = total; + p->title = title; + p->size = size; + + if (ui_progress__ops->init) + ui_progress__ops->init(p); +} + +void ui_progress__finish(void) +{ + if (ui_progress__ops->finish) + ui_progress__ops->finish(); +} |
