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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/perf/ui/keysyms.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/ui/keysyms.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/perf/ui/keysyms.c | 44 |
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/ui/keysyms.c b/tools/perf/ui/keysyms.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b64564b07 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/perf/ui/keysyms.c @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#include "keysyms.h" +#include <linux/ctype.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> + +const char *key_name(int key, char *bf, size_t size) +{ + if (isprint(key)) { + scnprintf(bf, size, "%c", key); + } else if (key < 32) { + scnprintf(bf, size, "Ctrl+%c", key + '@'); + } else { + const char *name = NULL; + + switch (key) { + case K_DOWN: name = "Down"; break; + case K_END: name = "End"; break; + case K_ENTER: name = "Enter"; break; + case K_ESC: name = "ESC"; break; + case K_F1: name = "F1"; break; + case K_HOME: name = "Home"; break; + case K_LEFT: name = "Left"; break; + case K_PGDN: name = "PgDown"; break; + case K_PGUP: name = "PgUp"; break; + case K_RIGHT: name = "Right"; break; + case K_TAB: name = "Tab"; break; + case K_UNTAB: name = "Untab"; break; + case K_UP: name = "Up"; break; + case K_BKSPC: name = "Backspace"; break; + case K_DEL: name = "Del"; break; + default: + if (key >= SL_KEY_F(1) && key <= SL_KEY_F(63)) + scnprintf(bf, size, "F%d", key - SL_KEY_F(0)); + else + scnprintf(bf, size, "Unknown (%d)", key); + } + + if (name) + scnprintf(bf, size, "%s", name); + } + + return bf; +} |
