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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /tools/perf/tests/openat-syscall-tp-fields.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/perf/tests/openat-syscall-tp-fields.c')
-rw-r--r--tools/perf/tests/openat-syscall-tp-fields.c163
1 files changed, 163 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/perf/tests/openat-syscall-tp-fields.c b/tools/perf/tests/openat-syscall-tp-fields.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9ff8caff9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/perf/tests/openat-syscall-tp-fields.c
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include "evlist.h"
+#include "evsel.h"
+#include "thread_map.h"
+#include "record.h"
+#include "tests.h"
+#include "debug.h"
+#include "util/mmap.h"
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <perf/mmap.h>
+#include "util/sample.h"
+
+#ifndef O_DIRECTORY
+#define O_DIRECTORY 00200000
+#endif
+#ifndef AT_FDCWD
+#define AT_FDCWD -100
+#endif
+
+static int test__syscall_openat_tp_fields(struct test_suite *test __maybe_unused,
+ int subtest __maybe_unused)
+{
+ struct record_opts opts = {
+ .target = {
+ .uses_mmap = true,
+ },
+ .no_buffering = true,
+ .freq = 1,
+ .mmap_pages = 256,
+ .raw_samples = true,
+ };
+ const char *filename = "/etc/passwd";
+ int flags = O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY;
+ struct evlist *evlist = evlist__new();
+ struct evsel *evsel;
+ int ret = TEST_FAIL, err, i, nr_events = 0, nr_polls = 0;
+ char sbuf[STRERR_BUFSIZE];
+
+ if (evlist == NULL) {
+ pr_debug("%s: evlist__new\n", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ evsel = evsel__newtp("syscalls", "sys_enter_openat");
+ if (IS_ERR(evsel)) {
+ pr_debug("%s: evsel__newtp\n", __func__);
+ ret = PTR_ERR(evsel) == -EACCES ? TEST_SKIP : TEST_FAIL;
+ goto out_delete_evlist;
+ }
+
+ evlist__add(evlist, evsel);
+
+ err = evlist__create_maps(evlist, &opts.target);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ pr_debug("%s: evlist__create_maps\n", __func__);
+ goto out_delete_evlist;
+ }
+
+ evsel__config(evsel, &opts, NULL);
+
+ perf_thread_map__set_pid(evlist->core.threads, 0, getpid());
+
+ err = evlist__open(evlist);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ pr_debug("perf_evlist__open: %s\n",
+ str_error_r(errno, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)));
+ goto out_delete_evlist;
+ }
+
+ err = evlist__mmap(evlist, UINT_MAX);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ pr_debug("evlist__mmap: %s\n",
+ str_error_r(errno, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)));
+ goto out_delete_evlist;
+ }
+
+ evlist__enable(evlist);
+
+ /*
+ * Generate the event:
+ */
+ openat(AT_FDCWD, filename, flags);
+
+ while (1) {
+ int before = nr_events;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < evlist->core.nr_mmaps; i++) {
+ union perf_event *event;
+ struct mmap *md;
+
+ md = &evlist->mmap[i];
+ if (perf_mmap__read_init(&md->core) < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ while ((event = perf_mmap__read_event(&md->core)) != NULL) {
+ const u32 type = event->header.type;
+ int tp_flags;
+ struct perf_sample sample;
+
+ ++nr_events;
+
+ if (type != PERF_RECORD_SAMPLE) {
+ perf_mmap__consume(&md->core);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ perf_sample__init(&sample, /*all=*/false);
+ err = evsel__parse_sample(evsel, event, &sample);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_debug("Can't parse sample, err = %d\n", err);
+ perf_sample__exit(&sample);
+ goto out_delete_evlist;
+ }
+
+ tp_flags = perf_sample__intval(&sample, "flags");
+ perf_sample__exit(&sample);
+ /* C library wrapper may set additional flags,
+ access mode must be unchanged */
+ if ((tp_flags & O_ACCMODE) != (flags & O_ACCMODE) ||
+ (tp_flags & flags) != flags) {
+ pr_debug("%s: Expected flags=%#x, got %#x\n",
+ __func__, flags, tp_flags);
+ goto out_delete_evlist;
+ }
+
+ goto out_ok;
+ }
+ perf_mmap__read_done(&md->core);
+ }
+
+ if (nr_events == before)
+ evlist__poll(evlist, 10);
+
+ if (++nr_polls > 5) {
+ pr_debug("%s: no events!\n", __func__);
+ goto out_delete_evlist;
+ }
+ }
+out_ok:
+ ret = TEST_OK;
+out_delete_evlist:
+ evlist__delete(evlist);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct test_case tests__syscall_openat_tp_fields[] = {
+ TEST_CASE_REASON("syscalls:sys_enter_openat event fields",
+ syscall_openat_tp_fields,
+ "permissions"),
+ { .name = NULL, }
+};
+
+struct test_suite suite__syscall_openat_tp_fields = {
+ .desc = "syscalls:sys_enter_openat event fields",
+ .test_cases = tests__syscall_openat_tp_fields,
+};