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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/lib/vsprintf.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/lib/vsprintf.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/lib/vsprintf.c | 44 |
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/lib/vsprintf.c b/tools/lib/vsprintf.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8780b4cda --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/lib/vsprintf.c @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <stdio.h> + +int vscnprintf(char *buf, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list args) +{ + int i = vsnprintf(buf, size, fmt, args); + ssize_t ssize = size; + + return (i >= ssize) ? (ssize - 1) : i; +} + +int scnprintf(char * buf, size_t size, const char * fmt, ...) +{ + ssize_t ssize = size; + va_list args; + int i; + + va_start(args, fmt); + i = vsnprintf(buf, size, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + + return (i >= ssize) ? (ssize - 1) : i; +} + +int scnprintf_pad(char * buf, size_t size, const char * fmt, ...) +{ + ssize_t ssize = size; + va_list args; + int i; + + va_start(args, fmt); + i = vscnprintf(buf, size, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + + if (i < (int) size) { + for (; i < (int) size; i++) + buf[i] = ' '; + buf[i] = 0x0; + } + + return (i >= ssize) ? (ssize - 1) : i; +} |
