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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /tools/lib/thermal/sampling.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/lib/thermal/sampling.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/lib/thermal/sampling.c | 77 |
1 files changed, 77 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/lib/thermal/sampling.c b/tools/lib/thermal/sampling.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f67c1f9ea --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/lib/thermal/sampling.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ +// Copyright (C) 2022, Linaro Ltd - Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org> +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include <thermal.h> +#include "thermal_nl.h" + +static int handle_thermal_sample(struct nl_msg *n, void *arg) +{ + struct nlmsghdr *nlh = nlmsg_hdr(n); + struct genlmsghdr *genlhdr = genlmsg_hdr(nlh); + struct nlattr *attrs[THERMAL_GENL_ATTR_MAX + 1]; + struct thermal_handler_param *thp = arg; + struct thermal_handler *th = thp->th; + + arg = thp->arg; + + genlmsg_parse(nlh, 0, attrs, THERMAL_GENL_ATTR_MAX, NULL); + + switch (genlhdr->cmd) { + + case THERMAL_GENL_SAMPLING_TEMP: + return th->ops->sampling.tz_temp( + nla_get_u32(attrs[THERMAL_GENL_ATTR_TZ_ID]), + nla_get_u32(attrs[THERMAL_GENL_ATTR_TZ_TEMP]), arg); + default: + return THERMAL_ERROR; + } +} + +thermal_error_t thermal_sampling_handle(struct thermal_handler *th, void *arg) +{ + struct thermal_handler_param thp = { .th = th, .arg = arg }; + + if (!th) + return THERMAL_ERROR; + + if (nl_cb_set(th->cb_sampling, NL_CB_VALID, NL_CB_CUSTOM, + handle_thermal_sample, &thp)) + return THERMAL_ERROR; + + return nl_recvmsgs(th->sk_sampling, th->cb_sampling); +} + +int thermal_sampling_fd(struct thermal_handler *th) +{ + if (!th) + return -1; + + return nl_socket_get_fd(th->sk_sampling); +} + +thermal_error_t thermal_sampling_exit(struct thermal_handler *th) +{ + if (nl_unsubscribe_thermal(th->sk_sampling, th->cb_sampling, + THERMAL_GENL_SAMPLING_GROUP_NAME)) + return THERMAL_ERROR; + + nl_thermal_disconnect(th->sk_sampling, th->cb_sampling); + + return THERMAL_SUCCESS; +} + +thermal_error_t thermal_sampling_init(struct thermal_handler *th) +{ + if (nl_thermal_connect(&th->sk_sampling, &th->cb_sampling)) + return THERMAL_ERROR; + + if (nl_subscribe_thermal(th->sk_sampling, th->cb_sampling, + THERMAL_GENL_SAMPLING_GROUP_NAME)) + return THERMAL_ERROR; + + return THERMAL_SUCCESS; +} |
